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Ideology and Exceptionalism in
Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study
Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytcht
INTRODUCTION
Can Supreme Court justices' views on abortion, racial profiling, and
medical malpractice predict how they will vote in intellectual property cases? It
may be natural to assume that a justice's views on those topics are irrelevant;
they are, after all, unrelated legal fields. It is certainly the dominant view
among intellectual property (IP) scholars that copyright, patent, and trademark
cases hinge on doctrinal rules and policy issues specific to IP. However, legal
realists and political scientists have shown that judges are strongly influenced
by political ideology and that judges' ideological positions are consistent across
diverse issue areas. The question then becomes: is IP the exception to the
attitudinalist rule that ideology affects case outcomes? This Article challenges
the widely held belief that IP cases are immune from the influence of judicial
ideology, a belief we call "IP exceptionalism."
Judicial attitudes towards IP have become increasingly important. The
Supreme Court's 2006-2007 term witnessed a remarkable number of major
cases that raised fundamental questions in relation to both the acquisition and
the legitimate exercise of IP rights.' The increasing attention given to
intellectual property issues by the Supreme Court is not surprising, considering
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the paradigm shift created by the rise of the internet economy and the
biotechnology industry, each of which has made the impact of IP laws
pervasive. Consequently, analyzing the determinants of IP cases has become a
pressing imperative for Supreme Court scholarship. It is particularly important
to know whether IP cases are shaped by the same ideological rifts that drive
divisive social issues, such as affirmative action, executive power, and
Supreme Court nominations; if they are, case outcomes can be better predicted
by understanding the role ofjudicial ideology.
This Article explores whether the outcomes of IP cases are influenced by
judicial ideology as measured on the traditional liberal-conservative scale.
Legal realists have long claimed that judicial decision-making is a function of
the political preferences and attitudes held by judges.2 Developing this claim,
political scientists working within the "attitudinal school" have shown
empirically that ideology is a significant determinant 3 -arguably the dominant
determinant-of judicial decisions in general.4 But this inquiry has not been
pursued systematically in relation to IP. Rather, many intellectual property
scholars claim that IP law is a function of its own peculiar jurisprudential
complexities and is not amenable to conventional ideological analysis.
5
There are sound reasons for thinking that IP might constitute an exception
to this general tendency. IP raises questions that have the potential to divide
conservatives and liberals alike, as it pits principles of liberty, property, and
free expression against one another. For example, vindicating the property
claims of an IP owner arguably interferes with the ability of rivals to compete,
of subsequent authors to build upon a prior work, or of the public to freely
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.").
3. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL] (finding
the attitudinal model predicts 76% of cases correctly in search and seizure cases); Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997)
(finding that ideology significantly influences judicial decision-making and finding further that
judges' votes are also greatly affected by the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel in
environmental cases). For additional examples, see notes 17-23. The attitudinal model is discussed
in more detail infra Part I.A.
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 28 (1997) (reviewing the attitudinalist literature and
arguing the attitudinal model has strong empirical support, whereas the empirical evidence of
strategic models is problematic); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare
Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. Sc. 971 (1996)
(showing Supreme Court justices decide cases according to their pre-existing revealed preferences
in 90.8% of cases, and in only 9.2% of cases did a justice switch to the position established in the
landmark precedent; concluding stare decisis does not strongly influence Supreme Court justices).
5. See infra Part I.B.
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express a point of view.
6
To resolve this important question, we conduct a broad empirical study to
rigorously test the attitudinal model as applied to IP litigation. This is the first
study of this kind.7 Indeed, the role of judicial ideology in economic cases in
general-cases involving issues such as taxation, securities, and antitrust, as
8
well as IP-has not been clearly established. Thus an empirical study of the
effect of ideology in IP cases informs both IP literature and the broader judicial
ideology literature.
In this Article, we examine the effect of judicial ideology on IP case
outcomes before the Supreme Court from 1954 to 2006. We find that ideology
is a significant determinant of IP cases: the more conservative a justice is, the
more likely he or she is to vote in favor of recognizing and enforcing rights to
intellectual property. We also find evidence that the relationship is more
complex than a purely ideological account would suggest; our results suggest
that law matters too. We find that a number of factors that are specific to IP are
also consequential. Additionally, we show that although ideology is highly
predictive of IP outcomes, the size of this effect is nonetheless significantly
lower than it is in cases involving prominent social issues, such as voting rights
6. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON.
101, 101-28 (2001); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 49/50 ANNALES D'EcONOMIE STATISTIQUE 223,
223-46 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283 (1996).
7. Two prior studies partially address this question. However, they are both narrow in
scope and have null results, from which no conclusive inferences can be drawn. Barton Beebe's
study of the application of the Polaroid factors in trademark cases calls attention to the possibility
that political ideology might affect judicial decision-making in this context but finds no significant
effect. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006). Likewise, Kimberly Moore's study of patent claim
construction appeals finds no significant difference in how judges appointed by Republicans and
judges appointed by Democrats construe patent claims, nor any discemable difference in their
tendencies to affirm or reverse district court claim constructions. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are
District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001). Polk
Wagner and Lee Petherbrige analyze whether Federal Circuit judges follow a methodology that is
either "procedural" or "holistic" in their claim construction jurisprudence. Such differences in
methodology could be said to be ideological in the most general sense, but they do not equate to
the study of political ideology undertaken here. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is The
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1105 (2004). Note also that John Allison and Mark Lemley considered this question in their
review of patent validity decisions in the Federal Circuit, but did not pursue it because
Republican-appointed judges accounted for 92.3% of opinions in their sample. See John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 745 (2000).
8. There is no strict categorization of economic cases, but most scholars seem to agree on
what is encompassed by the term. Topics other than those listed that would constitute economic
cases include bankruptcy, corporate law issues generally, and commercial contracting. See infra
notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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or the death penalty. We therefore conclude that although ideology is an
important element in predicting IP decisions, there may nonetheless be real
differences between the effect of ideology in social and economic cases.
Part I of the Article explains the basis for the broad attitudinal claim that
case outcomes have ideological derivations. It then presents the theoretical
basis for the competing claim that IP is immune to the general impact of
ideology on judicial decisions. Part II provides an overview of some of the
anecdotal evidence relied upon by exceptionalists and the attitudinalist
response. We identify three central interrelated phenomena that scholars point
to as evidence of IP's exceptionalism: the unusual prevalence of unanimous
opinions, surprising judicial coalitions, and judges voting against ideological
type. Part II also considers and counters these claims from an attitudinalist
perspective.
We conduct our empirical analysis in Part III. This Part first offers some
impressionistic evidence of IP exceptionalism by comparing judicial voting
coalitions in IP cases to coalitions in Supreme Court decisions generally. We
then apply regression analysis to test four hypotheses: (1) that ideology affects
judicial decision-making; (2) that the effect of judicial ideology on outcomes
differs between various types of IP claims; (3) that the effect of ideology differs
between liberal and conservative justices; and (4) that the effect of ideology on
IP cases differs from its effects in other cases. Part IV presents the implications
of our analysis for IP in particular and for judicial scholarship in general, and
considers potential extensions of our analysis.
I
THE INFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ATTITUDINALISM
VERSUS EXCEPTIONALISM
A. Intellectual Property and the Attitudinal Model
There is a rich literature demonstrating the significance of ideology in
judicial decision-making in both the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal courts
of appeal. 9 Ideology typically refers to an overarching framework of beliefs,
with sufficient consistency among constituent belief elements that knowledge
of an individual's ideology allows for prediction of his or her views on related
topics. The attitudinal model of judicial decision-making applies a construct of
9. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) [hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED]; SEGAL & SPAETH, THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 3; see also Lee
Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783 (2003)
(providing an overview of various studies); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology
in American Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. Sys. J. 219 (1999) (providing an overview of
various studies); infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 97:801
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ideology that reduces to a single continuum: liberal-conservative.
Attitudinalists posit that ideology is not only an important factor in
understanding the behavior of judges, but more controversially that ideology is
the most important factor.
10
The attitudinal model regards judges as rational maximizers of their
ideological preferences who attempt to bring the law in line with their personal
political commitments." Judges "accomplish this mission, according to some
political science accounts, by voting on the basis of their sincerely held
ideological (liberal or conservative) attitudes vis-A-vis the facts of cases, and
nothing more."'
' 2
The attitudinal model rests on two assumptions. The first is that judges
have ideological preferences related to the cases that come before them. The
second is that, either consciously or unconsciously, these preferences affect
their decisions. The first assumption is fairly uncontroversial in relation to
contested social issues, but many take issue with the second.' 3 Nonetheless,
judicial interviews, 14 first-hand judicial accounts,' 5 and numerous studies of
judicial behavior have shown that judges care strongly about the outcomes of
many cases and about which cases they hear. 6 Provided the issues raised are
ideologically salient, it follows that judges will decide cases ideologically.
The effect of ideology in Supreme Court decisions has been demonstrated
across a number of issue areas including the death penalty,' 7 freedom of
speech,18 search and seizure, 19 federalism, 20 and administrative law.2l The
10. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 81, 85 (2006) ("[I]n virtually all political science accounts of Court decisions, ideology
moves to center stage.").
11. Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (suggesting judges seek to
maximize income and leisure in addition to other sources of utility).
12. Epstein & Segal, supra note 10, at 85-86 (footnote omitted).
13. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C.
Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998).
14. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE (1991).
15. See Posner, supra note 11.
16. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 22-55 (1998);
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT xii-xiii (1948); SEGAL & SPAETH, THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 3.
17. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision
Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 323 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Epstein & Segal, supra note 10 (finding that although generally the more
liberal a justice, the more likely she or he will favor litigants alleging abridgment of First
Amendment rights, liberal justices are no more likely than their conservative counterparts to
uphold First Amendment claims where other values, such as privacy and equality, are prominently
at stake; if anything, conservatives are more likely and liberals are less likely to vote in favor of
speech, press, assembly, or association claims).
19. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 9, at
316-20.
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effect of ideology has also been demonstrated in the federal courts of appeal in
areas as diverse as environmental regulation, administrative law, corporate law,
campaign finance law, and affirmative action and discrimination law.22 One
comprehensive study of almost 15,000 individual judges' votes in twelve
different issue areas for the federal courts of appeal found that ideology (as
measured by the political party of the appointing president) was a good
predictor of how individual judges vote in nine of the twelve issue areas.23
One gap in the literature establishing the effect of ideology is in what may
be labeled "economic cases"-those areas of the law concerned with economic
division, such as taxation, securities, antitrust, and IP. Most studies have
established the salience of ideology for obviously politicized areas, such as
civil rights, civil liberties, criminal law, environmental law, and labor
regulation. There is far less evidence that judicial ideology is determinative in
economic cases. Staudt, Epstein, and Wiedenbeck commented recently that
"[s]tudy after study confirms a strong correlation between judges' political
preferences and their behavior in civil rights and liberties cases, but researchers
20. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741
(2000) (finding that ideology dominates questions of institutional federalism); see also David B.
Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence:
A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125 (1999) (finding that federal judges decide
preemption cases partly based on ideology, but constrained by the facts and the legal context, and
not necessarily monolithically based on party affiliation); but see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan
Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court, 14 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 86 (2006) (finding that
preemption cases are multi-dimensional and are unlikely to yield clear confirmation for either an
"attitudinal" or a "legal" model ofjudicial behavior).
21. Donald W. Crowley, Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the Type of
Agency Matter?, 40 W. POL. Q. 265, 276 (1987) (finding that Justice Rehnquist consistently
favored conservative administrative determinations and that Justice Brennan favored liberal
outcomes).
22. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J.
2155 (1998) (reviewing administrative regulations under a deferential Supreme Court rule
likewise found a significant ideological effect); Pinello, supra note 9, at 236 (a study of circuit
court decisions in several areas found significant, but varying, effects of panel ideology on
decisions); Revesz, supra note 3 (finding a pronounced difference in the decisions of judges
appointed by Democratic presidents and those appointed by Republicans in D.C. Circuit rulings in
environmental regulation cases).
23. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Essay, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004). The areas were abortion, affirmative
action, campaign finance, capital punishment, Commerce Clause challenges to congressional
enactments, the Contracts Clause, criminal appeals, disability discrimination, industry challenges
to environmental regulation, piercing the corporate veil, race discrimination, sex discrimination,
and claimed takings of private property without just compensation. The three areas where an
effect could not be established were criminal appeals, takings claims, and Commerce Clause
challenges to congressional enactments. Id. at 306; see infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text
(discussing the limitations of the party of the appointing president as a measure of judicial
ideology).
[Vol. 97:801
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have only rarely identified an association between politics and decisions in
economics cases."24 For example, a study of Supreme Court cases dealing with
securities and antitrust law discounted the attitudinal model, noting that there
was "an expansive period as to both securities and antitrust during the Warren
Court, followed by a distinct correction period after Justices Powell and
Rehnquist joined the Court in 1972 preceding a third period after Powell's
retirement . . . , in which the results are more evenly split .... 25 The authors
note further that "the cases are few and far between. 26
Traditional measures of ideology have also fared badly in the context of
Supreme Court tax cases. A recent analysis of the Court's tax cases found no
support for the role of ideology in general.27 Another study found that decisions
on taxpayer standing are ideological, but only when legal doctrine is vague and
when little or no judicial monitoring exists. 28 Likewise, a study of circuit court
tax decisions found that political ideology has some influence on tax case
outcomes, but only when combined with other sociological characteristics of a
judge-namely, race and how elite the judge's law school was.29
Studies of the effect of ideology of IP cases in particular have been
extremely limited. Two prior studies examined the effect of ideology in specific
IP contexts, but only as an incident to their primary inquiries. In assessing the
application of the Polaroid factors in trademark cases, Barton Beebe tested
whether political ideology affects decision-making, but found no effect.
30
Similarly, Kimberly Moore tested for the effect of ideology in patent claim
construction decisions but found no result.31 Both of these studies failed to
provide support for the attitudinalist model. However, they cannot constitute
evidence against it because they found only null results.32 Even within the
attitudinalist field, questions have been raised as to whether IP is clearly
24. Nancy Staudt et al., The Ideological Component of Judging in the Taxation Context, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1799 (2006).
25. E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The
Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1572 (2004).
26. Id.
27. See Staudt, supra note 24 (finding no effect for ideology in tax cases in general, but
finding that ideology is significant in the sub-set of corporate tax cases).
28. See Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 647 (2004).
29. See Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins
Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?, 25 VA. TAX
REV. 201, 230-34 (2005).
30. See Beebe, supra note 7.
31. See Moore, supra note 7.
32. A null result in a statistical study means that an effect cannot be established. However,
the failure of regression analysis to reject a null hypothesis should not be taken to indicate that the
null hypothesis is true. See ROBERT M. LIEBERT & LYNN LANGENBACH LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND
BEHAVIOR 92 (4th ed. 1995). Thus Beebe and Moore's studies do not establish IP's
exceptionalism, rather they simply fail to establish the effect of judicial ideology in each of their
subfields.
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ideological in the same way as other areas of the law. 33
Why would ideology affect some areas of judicial decision-making and
not others? One explanation is that these cases are quite simply the "'boring
cases'-cases requiring technical legal analysis such as statutory interpretation
and doctrinal analysis, without much impact on constitutional rights or other
'interesting' areas of law." 34 Tax cases in particular are often singled out as
"boring" in this sense. 35 Staudt et al. reject this view, arguing that it is
"extremely unlikely that judges and Justices simply set aside their political
preferences in cases involving business and finance questions, or that the
preferences are so weak they cannot show up in empirical studies."
36
A second explanation is that there is nothing wrong with the attitudinal
model; it is simply that the traditional method of coding data is inapposite in
economic cases. For example, Staudt et al. have suggested that the traditional
case coding rules misclassify outcomes in tax cases. 37 The traditional coding
refers again to the Spaeth dataset, which codes tax decisions in favor of the
taxpayer as conservative and decisions in favor of the government as liberal.38
Staudt et al. conclude that "these coding rules work well in the civil rights
context but produce unexpected errors in business and finance litigation."
39
More generally, they speculate that "the null findings in the extant literature
may be a by-product of the ways in which scholars have operationalized the
term 'ideology' in business and finance cases. ' ' 4 0 Indeed, by adopting a more
selective classification system, Staudt et al. have shown that politics does
indeed play a role in Supreme Court decision-making in business and finance
litigation.4 '
In summary, there is a wealth of evidence that ideology is a significant
factor in judicial decision-making. But this scholarship is far less developed in
demonstrating that the same effect can be found in economic cases. This raises
the question of whether the salience of ideology is stronger in non-economic
33. See Paul H. Edelman et al., Measuring Deviations from Expected Voting Patterns on
Collegial Courts (2d Ann. Conf. on Empirical Legal Stud., Working Paper 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractjid=998297 (suggesting, among other
possibilities, that copyright cases often involve very technical legal questions and are less clearly
ideological).
34. Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice & "Boring" Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 2D
401, 403 (2001).
35. Id. at 403-08.
36. Staudt et al., supra note 24, at 1811.
37. Id.
38. Id. The United States Supreme Court Judicial Database is a widely used database of
Supreme Court opinions developed by Harold J. Spaeth. See Harold J. Spaeth, The Original U.S.
Supreme Court Judicial Database, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm (last visited Sept.
19, 2008). We discuss this coding in more detail infra Part l1I.A.
39. Staudt et al., supra note 24, at 1802.
40. Id. at 1812.
41. See id. at 1815-20.
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issue areas. In the next Section we consider theories of why IP in particular
may not fit the attitudinal model.
B. Theories of Intellectual Property Exceptionalism
In spite of the significant body of evidence that political ideology plays a
role in higher court decision-making generally, there is a widely held view
among those practicing and studying IP that the traditional ideological divide
between "liberals" and "conservatives" has little or no relevance in their
specialized field.42 Those in the IP trenches appear to regard judges as either
impartial or indifferent to questions of IP.4 3 Those who do consider the issue of
ideology usually conclude that the political labels of "liberal" and
"conservative" are inapplicable in the context of IP.44
The belief that ideology does not affect judicial behavior in the IP context
raises some interesting questions. If the prevailing wisdom of the IP community
is correct, IP poses a significant challenge to the attitudinal model and suggests
that its proponents may have failed to account for differences in specific fields
42. See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 33 (2008) ("As of
2006, eight of the twelve active judges [on the Federal Circuit] were appointed by Republican
Presidents, and four by Democrats-though given that patent law issues rarely separate neatly
along political party lines, this statistic is of only limited relevance."); James E. Rogan, Foreword,
Intellectual Property and the Challenge of Protecting It, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y xv, xvi (2004)
(relating Rogan's personal experience that intellectual property issues are rarely partisan: "[B]attle
lines typically did not break down along Republican or Democrat lines: when IP warfare erupted,
it tended to be a battle between those who understood the importance of intellectual property, and
those who did not"); William Patty, Does Ideology Matter in Copyright?, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT
BLOG, http://williampatry.blogspot.com (Dec. 14, 2005, 7:17 EST) (questioning whether there is
an ideology of copyright in a functional sense and whether ideologies of copyright have ever had
any demonstrable impact). The strength of this belief is aptly demonstrated by Ann Bartow, who
declares in a recent article that "[ildentification as a Democrat or Republican does not provide too
much guidance or create too many expectations about a person's views of intellectual property
issues." Ann Bartow, When Bias is Bipartisan: Teaching About the Democratic Process in an
Intellectual Property Law Republic, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 715, 715 (2008). Curiously, Bartow's
statement is followed immediately by a footnote to an earlier version of this Article. Id. at 715 n.2.
Bartow dismisses our findings-which contradict her assertion-by arguing that we do not have
sufficient evidence that the view we label IP exceptionalism actually exists. Id. We are indebted to
Bartow for providing us with such a compelling illustration of the exceptionalist view.
43. See Melvin Simensky, Does the Supreme Court Have a "Liberal" or "Conservative"
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence?: An Evening with Kenneth Starr & Martin Garbus, I I
MEDIA L. & POL'Y 116, 116 (2003) (quoting Kenneth Starr as rejecting the notion that the
Supreme Court is ideological and arguing that the number of unanimous decisions on the Supreme
Court "bespeaks the underlying and, in many respects, overriding professionalism of this very
lawyerly court").
44. See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609,
616 n.34 (2006) (acknowledging that the political labels of"liberal" and "conservative" have crept
into the discourse of copyright, but also noting confusion as to their meaning); Robert S. Boynton,
The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 25, 2004, at 40, 42 (stating that the lawyers,
scholars and activists forming Lawrence Lessig's "free culture movement" are neither "wild-eyed
radicals opposed to the use of copyright" "[n]or do they share a coherent political ideology").
2009]
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of law. Alternatively, if the attitudinalist school is correct and judicial ideology
shapes all areas of the law, this suggests that IP scholars and practitioners may
have fundamentally failed to understand a critical aspect of their own
discipline.
The relevance of ideology to IP is ultimately an empirical question and
should be answered accordingly. We expect that the exceptionalist view is
overstated, but to explore this issue, we want to consider the strongest case for
exceptionalism. However, because the marginalization of questions of ideology
is so substantial in the IP literature, very few articles even raise the question.45
We undertook a comprehensive study of contemporary newspaper coverage
and law review articles relating to every Supreme Court IP case in our dataset
for any mention of the ideological nature of the cases. With the exception of
Florida Prepaid, we found little or no mention of ideological terms. 46 In
contrast, when we performed the same search for 105 randomly selected
Supreme Court cases we found references to ideological terms in
approximately one third. The primary manifestation of the dominance of the
exceptionalist view is the invisibility of any discussion of the role of ideology.
Accordingly, to fill this gap in the literature, in this Section we attempt to set
forth as robust an account as possible of the arguments in favor of
exceptionalism.
There are two primary explanations for the perceived lack of ideological
influence on IP decisions. The first is that IP cases are largely technical and
legalistic and judges simply do not have policy preferences with respect to the
outcomes of such cases. For the reasons discussed below, we find this
implausible. The second (and more plausible) explanation for IP
exceptionalism is that judicial policy preferences with respect to IP do not fit
within the stereotypical view of the liberal-conservative ideological continuum.
The claim that judges simply do not have policy preferences because of
the technical nature of IP cases is similar to the "boring cases" view of tax-
that like tax cases, IP cases also require "technical legal analysis ... without
45. The studies by Beebe and Moore, discussed supra notes 30-32 and in the
accompanying text, are notable exceptions.
46. Using a FOCUS search on LexisNexis, we searched for citing references to Supreme
Court patent cases, using the search phrase: ["democrat" or "democratic" or "republican" or
"conservative" or "liberal" or "biased" or "left-wing" or "right-wing"]. Most hits related to a
secondary issue, for example, whether states can be subjected to private lawsuits. See, e.g., Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). The IP
aspects of decisions, however, were not discussed in political terms regardless of whether they
were a "victory for consumers" by allowing gray market products, see, for example, Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998), or a "victory for
makers of leading brand-name products." See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159 (1995). A search through the journals, in all cases, failed to turn up any discussion of political
motivations behind Supreme Court decisions which is often found in other areas of the law.
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much impact on constitutional rights or other 'interesting' areas of law." 47 This
seems implausible. Given the significance of IP rights in the modem economy,
it is unlikely that judges would not have opinions and policy preferences on the
fundamental questions raised by IP disputes. At a policy level, IP cases raise
questions regarding property rights, government regulation, freedom of
competition, and freedom of speech. The effects of IP laws are also widely felt
at a practical level. Copyright and patent law define the relationship between
creators (authors and inventors) and the public. Perhaps more importantly,
these laws also mediate the relationships between creators who build upon one
another's works.48 Similarly, trademark law and trade secret law each police
the means of competition between rival businesses: trademark law regulates the
ways in which a business may represent its products to consumers, and trade
secret law regulates the means by which a business acquires valuable
information held by another business.
The more plausible explanation for IP exceptionalism is that judicial
policy preferences regarding IP do not fit within the stereotypical view of the
liberal-conservative ideological continuum. The labels "liberal" and
"conservative" extrapolate easily in certain contexts: liberals (in the modem
sense) tend to look favorably upon social programs even if they require
government intervention in the economy, but unfavorably upon government
regulation of individual expression or "morality." Conservatives, in contrast,
generally resist government regulation of the economy in favor of market
solutions and privatization, but often endorse laws reinforcing "traditional
values."
49
Of particular relevance to our inquiry are the expected views of liberals
and conservatives on property rights. According to the traditional formulation,
conservatives are more likely to see private property as an end unto itself, and
liberals are more tolerant of incursions of private property rights for the greater
societal good. This division is reflected in the infamous Lochner decision, in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a New York law limiting the working
hours of bakers as an "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference
with the right and liberty of the individual ... to enter into . .. contracts. 5°
This division also forms the basis for the definition of what constitutes a liberal
47. Richards, supra note 34, at 403. It should be noted that the description of "boring" here
is somewhat circular as it essentially boils down to not interesting.
48. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) (discussing sequential innovation in copyright and patent law).
49. See, for example, the reaction to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and
discussion as to its effects on "morals" legislation, and the division this provoked in liberals
versus conservatives. Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1595 (2004).
50. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
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outcome in the dominant database of Supreme Court cases. 51
If the conventional measures of ideology apply to IP, then one would
expect conservatives to view IP as end unto itself. To the extent that IP is
viewed in the same way as traditional property, pro-property conservatives
should also be pro-IP. Equally, one would expect liberals to be more receptive
to placing limitations on IP rights in the pursuit of other social values, such as
free speech or distributive justice.52
But do the conventional measures apply? While it seems naive to think
that the justices do not have preferences relating to IP, it seems more plausible
that the nature of IP itself is ideologically ambiguous. This ambiguity manifests
in four closely related questions. First, do IP rights originate from a natural
rights framework or a utilitarian one? Second, are IP rights property, or are they
an instrument of government regulation (or something entirely different)?
Third, do IP rights ultimately detract from or enhance individual liberty?
Fourth, do the differences between the various subfields of IP differently affect
the extent to which IP is ideological?
1. Natural Rights versus Utilitarian Accounts of Intellectual Property
In the United States, the institution of private property is predominantly
justified in terms of natural rights, 53 though the primary justifications for IP
tend to be instrumentalist and utilitarian. 54 This contrast between real property
and IP is discernable in the text of the U.S. Constitution itself. For example, the
Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment provide that: "No
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 55 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall
. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. '56 In contrast, all that the Constitution says about IP is that: "The Congress
51. Spaeth, supra note 38; see infra note 134 (giving a detailed description of the coding
categories of liberal and conservative case outcomes employed in the Spaeth database).
52. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004);
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property 'from Below ": Copyright and Capability for Education, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803 (2007); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1540 (2005).
53. See, e.g., Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993);
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy ofIntellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 288 (1988).
54. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JANE C. GINSBURG, FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 21 (2004) (stating that the "'utilitarian' view of intellectual property is widely held to
be the intellectual foundation for U.S. intellectual property law").
55. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262; Universal
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shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 57 Although the Constitution gives
Congress the authority to grant patents and copyrights, it does so only for the
limited purpose of promoting "the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 58 The
Constitution protects private property rights as a fundamental aspect of
individual liberty; in contrast, the constitutional provision for patents and
copyrights appears to be merely instrumental.59
The text of the Constitution may not be dispositive on this question.
However, it raises a strong presumptive case for viewing conventional property
ights through the lens of natural rights while regarding IP rights
instrumentally. Furthermore, even if one accepts that the underlying rationale
for creating, recognizing, and enforcing IP rights has roots in both utilitarian
and natural rights based theories, 61 this too becomes a cause for ideological
uncertainty, because utilitarian and rights-based approaches to IP frequently
conflict. 62 To the extent that IP rights are not attributable to a natural rights
framework, one might expect that they would have less intrinsic appeal to
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st.
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN
AND OF THE CITIZEN, art. XVII (Fr. 1789).
57. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
58. Id.; see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved."); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151 (1975).
59. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 303-04
(1998) (noting that the Constitution's copyright and patent clause is cast in instrumental terms).
The Constitution makes no specific provision for trademark or trade secret rights. See Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). Congressional power with respect to trademarks is based on the
Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
60. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress 's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006)
(arguing that the Framers intended the preamble in the IP Clause, "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," to serve as a limitation on congressional power). But see Adam Mossoff,
Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege"
in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007) (arguing that historically patent rights
were defined and enforced in part as natural rights); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property
and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004) (questioning historically derived
understandings of the limits of the Intellectual Property Clause); Thomas B. Nachbar,
Constructing Copyright's Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 46 (2002).
61. See Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy,
Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006); see also Mossoff, supra
note 60; Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
62. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 544
(2004).
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political conservatives.
63
2. Property, Regulation, or Tertium Quid?64
The concept of property in physical objects is well understood, and is one
of the oldest institutions of human civilization.65 The concept of IP-or more
specifically, the discrete concepts of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade
secrets-has far more recent origins.66 This is significant because conservatives
generally idealize forms of social order that evolve over time, but they
condemn institutions imposed by planners, engineers, politicians, and other
societal decision-makers. 67 From this perspective, the common law of property
is both evolved and longstanding, whereas the various forms of IP are more
recent and conspicuously engineered.68
Indeed, IP can be analogized to many other legal forms:
6 9 property, 70
tort,71 government subsidy,72 and government regulation.73 Each of these
analogies tilts in a different ideological direction. One might predict that
63. This is not to suggest that there are not purely utilitarian conservatives.
64. Tertium quid is something that cannot be classified into either of two groups considered
exhaustive: an intermediate thing or factor-a term artfully employed by Justice Scalia in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000).
65. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 2 (4th ed. 2006).
66. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005). How recently is a matter of some debate. See Hughes, supra note 61.
67. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 118 (4th ed. 2004).
68. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575 (2003); Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004). But note that
bankruptcy and corporate law are just as recent and conspicuously engineered as IP, yet their
appeal to conservatives is largely unquestioned.
69. See generally Lemley, supra note 66.
70. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual
Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 112 (1990); Edmund W.
Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1727 (2000). For assessments of this claim, see Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus
Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005); Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989) (discussing similarities between copyright
law and common law property); Lemley, supra note 66 (reviewing the literature); Henry E. Smith,
Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742,
1744 (2007) (noting grave doubts about whether intellectual property is property).
71. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law's Mirror Image: "Harms,"
"Benefits, " and the Uses and Limits ofAnalogy, 34 McGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003).
72. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Authors' Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229 (2003).
73. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 104, 194 (2004); Shubha Ghosh, Patents
and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1315 (2004); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 335, 336-37.
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conservative judges who favor private property rights would be inclined to
favor IP claims, but instead those judges could see IP laws as government
intervention in the free market. Equally, one might predict that liberal judges
would be more predisposed to see the virtue of government intervention in the
marketplace to promote creativity, but would also be more likely to see the
costs of granting property rights over information.
74
The politics of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 ("CTEA")
illustrates the Supreme Court's internal disagreement as to the appropriateness
of the property analogy. The CTEA extended copyright terms in the United
States by twenty years, both prospectively and retrospectively. 75 Proponents of
this extension argued that extending the basic term of protection from the life
of the author plus fifty years, to the life of the author plus seventy years, would
harmonize U.S. law with that of the European Union and would instill better
incentives to create and maintain copyrighted works.76 Critics of the legislation
have observed that retrospectively extending the copyright term cannot
logically be reconciled with an incentive-based system (dead people are
notoriously unresponsive to incentives) 77 and that the retrospective term
extension effectively freezes the advancement of the public domain.
78
The CTEA and the subsequent Eldred79 litigation place liberal and
conservative intuitions in tension. Although liberal justices might embrace an
unrestricted view of congressional power to regulate the economy, they would
not be expected to embrace the extension of private property and redistribution
of wealth in favor of large corporate interests.8 1 On the other hand, although
conservatives are predisposed to favor private property rights, a narrow reading
of Congressional authority under the Copyright Clause would have added
74. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 73, at 249 ("When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican might say, here
government regulation is simply getting in the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good
Democrat might say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no
good reason.").
75. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 102(b),
(d), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2006)).
76. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 196 (2003).
77. Id. at 258 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the CTEA would "neither encourage
creation nor benefit the long-dead author in any other important way"); Robert P. Merges, One
Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 2187,
2236 (2000) (describing the CTEA extension as 'virtually worthless' from an incentive
perspective and "a classic instance of almost pure rent-seeking legislation").
78. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 251-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner:
Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J.
2331 (2003).
81. Indeed, Justices Stevens and Breyer, generally considered to be liberal justices, see
infra Part II.B, were the dissenting justices in Eldred. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222
(2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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support to cases such as Lopez82 and Morrison,83 which adopted a narrow
reading of the Commerce Clause.84 We return to the Supreme Court's decision
in Eldred in Part IV to discuss which of these arguments might have been
expected to succeed before the Supreme Court, given the implications of our
results.
3. Intellectual Property Rights and Individual Liberty
Intellectual property laws have the potential to promote individual
autonomy by giving authors and inventors control over the product of their
labors. However, these same laws also constrain the autonomy of non-owners
by restricting the re-use and re-interpretation of protected works. All property
raises tension between property and liberty, but the non-rivalrous nature of
information means that this tension could lead to internal divisions within both
liberal and conservative camps. Whereas exclusion from ordinary property is
required to protect the holders' possessory interest, exclusion from intellectual
property may enable profit but is not necessary to maintain the possession of
the intangible good.85
This difference between tangible property and intellectual property
suggests why IP might foster ideological ambiguity and why elements of both
the left86 and the right express concern over the expansion of IP. 87 Because we
live in a world saturated with proprietary images and text, copyright and
trademark law have the potential to impede individual autonomy in a unique
way.88 Documentarians filming outside a tightly controlled studio,89 children
82. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
83. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
84. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1
(2004) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's limitations on the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause).
85. Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and
Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 192 (2006) (reviewing the economics of IP in the
context of copyright).
86. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS (1996).
87. See, e.g., N. Stephan Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD.,
Spring 2001, at 1, available at http://www.mises.org/joumals/jis/15_2/15_2-l.pdf, Roderick T.
Long, The Libertarian Case Against Intellectual Property Rights, 3 FORMULATIONS (1995),
available at http://libertariannation.org/a/f3 ll.html.
88. See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, UNTOLD
STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY
FILMMAKERS (2004), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/
UNTOLDSTORIESReport.pdf; MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? (2005), available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/
WillFairUseSurvive.pdf, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Essay, Trademarks
Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972 (1993).
89. LESSIG, supra note 73, at 95.
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playing at being superheroes, and fans expressing pride in their association
with sporting teams9 1 all run the risk of infringing the copyrights or trademarks
of numerous rights holders.
92
As Judge Alex Kozinski observed, although the courts defend free
expression when it affronts public morality93 or even when it compromises
national security, 9 4 they have drawn the line on free expression differently with
respect to copyright law:
Congress has given courts the power to order books burned. In a legal
regime as jealously protective of freedoms of speech and press as ours,
this ought to give us some pause. What's that, you say? Classified
documents about our Vietnam war effort have been stolen from the
Pentagon and given to the newspapers? You want an injunction to
avoid risking the death of soldiers, the destruction of alliances, the
prolongation of war? No way, Jose; this is the land of the brave and the
home of the free. But wait a minute--did you say someone drew a
picture of OJ Simpson wearing a goofy stovepipe hat? Light the
bonfires ... !95
As a result, for both liberal and conservative judges, the balance struck between
incentives to foster creativity and public access will not automatically mirror
the balance they would strike between governmental regulation and free speech
generally.
4. Intellectual Property Heterogeneity
In addition to the ideological ambiguity of IP in general, the attitudinal
model must also contend with the differences between the various subfields of
IP. These subfields--copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret law-are
distinct legal categories with potentially different ideological implications.
When aggregated, the tensions between the ideological implications of the
various subfields may cause the IP category as a whole to transect the
traditional ideological bounds between liberalism and conservatism.
90. See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age,
108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999).
91. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or
Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005).
92. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (discussing a number of examples).
93. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding that "Fuck the Draft" printed on
the appellant's jacket was not repugnant to constitutional speech protections).
94. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that the
government did not meet its burden of showing justification for the imposition of a prior restraint
of expression in relation to the publication of the Pentagon Papers).
95. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y 513, 516-17 (1999).
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Patent law balances the need for incentives for innovation against the
competing claims of competitors and second-generation inventors. Copyright
raises similar policy issues in many respects, but also requires recognition of
the public interest in freedom of expression-a salient issue for liberals in
particular. Trademark law, with its focus on preventing consumer confusion
instead of providing incentives, is different again. Even if there is a coherent
liberal or conservative view with respect to one field of IP, such as patent law,
one would not necessarily expect that view to apply to other fields of IP, such
as copyright, trademark, and trade secret. Therefore, it may be difficult to see
an effect of ideology on IP in an empirical inquiry because each area might pull
the Court in a different direction. Of course, if our empirical inquiry does show
a consistent effect for ideology on IP, that result is all the more persuasive
given the potential heterogeneity within IP.
In summary, IP may be ideologically ambiguous at a theoretical level
because: (1) IP rights are not unequivocally linked to a natural rights
framework; (2) the property analogy is in tension with the government
regulation analogy; and (3) the exercise of IP rights can detract from individual
liberty and freedom of expression in a different way than other restrictions of
speech. However, these philosophical complexities are only relevant for our
purposes to the extent that they affect judicial behavior. This is an empirical
question. The next Part explores the existing empirical evidence of
exceptionalism and shows it to be quite precarious.
II
ASSESSING EXISTING EVIDENCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
EXCEPTIONALISM
Attitudinalists have amassed a formidable body of evidence that judges
make decisions based on their ideological predilections. The previous Section
explored some of the theoretical reasons underpinning the widely held view
that conventional measures of ideology nevertheless have little or no relevance
to IP.9 6 This Section assesses the extent to which evidence in individual cases
lends support to the claim of IP exceptionalism and the attitudinalist response
to those claims.
A. Evidence of Exceptionalism
We consider three empirically driven arguments supporting IP exception-
alism in this Section. First, the Supreme Court decides an unusually large
number of IP cases unanimously. Second, there are a number of IP cases in
which justices vote against type; that is, cases in which conservative justices
96. See supra Part 1.B.
[Vol. 97:801
HeinOnline  -- 97 Cal. L. Rev. 818 2009
IDEOLOGY AND EXCEPTIONALISM IN IP
vote against an IP claim or liberal justices vote in favor of an IP claim. Third,
there are also many IP cases which produce strange coalitions of liberals and
conservatives that would appear to defy the predictions of an attitudinal model.
We present each of these observations in detail before turning to the attitudinal
response in Part Il.B.
Even Supreme Court justices agree sometimes. In general, the Court
averages about one unanimous opinion for every two divided opinions.97 The
Court's level of unanimity in IP cases is higher than average: about 45% of IP
cases between 1954 and 2006 were unanimous decisions. 98 Indeed, between
1997 and 2007 the Supreme Court decided sixteen IP cases on a unanimous
basis 99 and only eight otherwise.
00
It has been suggested that unanimous decisions demonstrate the justices'
impartiality and the ascendance of precedent over political preference.'
0
'
Critics of the attitudinal model often argue that unanimity and near-unanimity
are "hard to square" with the attitudinal model. For example, Michael Gerhardt
argues that "many unanimous and nearly unanimous opinions involve salient
issues on which the justices transcend their ideological differences to reach
agreement about the law."
102
97. See Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 520
tbl.IV (2004). On average, 35.5% of Supreme Court decisions in the 1994 to 2003 terms were
unanimous. The proportion of unanimous cases was as low as 29.6% in 1998 and as high as 43%
in 1997. Id.
98. This calculation is derived from our database of Supreme Court IP cases described in
detail infra Part III.A.
99. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); 111. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Merck KGaA
v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539
U.S. 23 (2003); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23
(2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Quality King Distribs., Inc.
v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
523 U.S. 340 (1998); Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Wamer-Jenkinson Co., Inc.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
100. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); Medlmmune, Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546
U.S. 394 (2006); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150 (1999).
101. Simensky, supra note 43, at 116 (citing Kenneth Starr's approbation of the
professionalism of the Court).
102. Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MIcH. L. REV. 1733, 1743 (2003)
(footnote omitted) (reviewing The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited by Jeffrey
A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth).
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The second empirical observation that causes many to doubt that IP cases
are ideologically determined is that there are a number of cases where the
justices vote against type. Applied to the realm of IP litigation, the attitudinal
model predicts that conservative judges will be predisposed to side with those
asserting IP rights and that liberal judges will be correspondingly predisposed
against them. Thus, when a conservative (liberal) judge votes for (against) the
IP owner, we say that the judge is voting according to type.
IP practitioners and scholars frequently point to the decisions of Justice
Ginsburg as refutation of the attitudinal model in the context of IP. Justice
Ginsburg is generally considered to be one of the more liberal judges on the
Court. However, she is also widely perceived as a reliable vote in favor of the
IP owner.10 3 Ginsburg is not the only justice who votes against type from time
to time. There are, for example, a number of split decisions in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, a conservative, voted against the IP owner,10 4 and in which
Justice Stevens, a liberal, voted in favor of the IP owner.
10 5
Not only do IP cases produce numerous examples of voting against type,
they also give rise to strange coalitions of liberals and conservatives that would
appear to defy the predictions of the attitudinal model. Figure 1 illustrates the
mean ideological positions of the members of the Rehnquist Court from 1994
to 2004 based on the ideology scores developed by political scientists Andrew
Martin and Kevin Quinn.
106
103. Justice Ginsburg has only twice voted against the IP owner in a non-unanimous
Supreme Court decision. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007);
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006); see also Lawrence Lessig,
How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/
printerfriendly.msp?id=544.
104. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661
(1990); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153
(1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394
(1974).
105. See, e.g., Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. 546 U.S. 394 (2006); Fla.
Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627; S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
106. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the US. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134-53 (2002).
Updated data is available at http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php. The figure shows the
average Martin-Quinn score for each justice during the period 1994-2004. We discuss the Martin-
Quinn scores in detail below. See infra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1
Rehnquist Court Judicial Ideology Scores (Martin-Quinn), 1994-2004 t°7
As Figure 1 illustrates, the justices are positioned from most liberal to
most conservative as follows: Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.' °8 Accordingly, we might expect to
see coalitions of justices who are ideologically proximate; we would not predict
ideologically discontinuous coalitions, such as a majority comprised of Justices
Stevens, Souter, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Thomas, or Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia.
0 9
As noted, Justice Ginsburg appears to present something of a paradox if
the attitudinal model of IP is to be believed. In Part III of this Article we
undertake a detailed analysis of the correlations of voting patterns between the
justices in IP cases and compare those to the correlations between the justices
across all Supreme Court cases. The comparison shows that the votes of
107. Data: Martin & Quinn, supra note 106.
108. The average Martin-Quinn scores for each justice between 1994 and 2004 were:
Stevens (-2.94); Ginsburg (-1.43); Souter (-1.17); Breyer (-1.05); O'Connor (0.51); Kennedy
(0.72); Rehnquist (1.45); Scalia (2.95); and Thomas (3.38).
109. Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist refer to this as "disordered voting." See Edelman et al.,
supra note 33.
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Justices Rehnquist and Ginsburg have a correlation of 0.42 across all cases, but
that in IP cases the correlation is 0.91.110 Justice Ginsburg's tendency to vote
more often with Justice Rehnquist in IP cases than she does with her more
liberal colleagues is evidence of both the strange coalition phenomena and of
voting against type."'I We examine these correlations in more detail in Part
III.C.
B. The Attitudinal Response
To review, proponents of IP exceptionalism usually support the theory by
citing evidence of: (1) unanimous cases; (2) judges voting against type; and (3)
strange coalitions of liberals and conservatives. We now present the
attitudinalist response to each of these elements of the exceptionalist claim.
The argument that unanimous decisions demonstrate judicial impartiality
or the ascendance of precedent over preference assumes that the facts of the
cases under review are moderate relative to the ideological positions of the
justices. That is, the argument assumes that the status quo under review lies
somewhere between the preferences of the liberal and conservative extremes of
the Court.112 However, even an appellate court with heterogeneous ideological
preferences could reach a unanimous decision if the lower court's ruling fell to
the extreme right or left of the preferences of the judges on the higher court.1 13
To take an extreme illustration, a unanimous Supreme Court decision to
overturn the imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile shoplifter would
hardly constitute evidence that Supreme Court justices have homogeneous
views on the death penalty, nor would it establish that death penalty cases are
non-ideological.
The Supreme Court's recent unanimous decisions in the context of IP may
be similarly misleading. For example, in the recent Grokster case, it was fairly
clear that all of the justices considered that allowing the providers of file
sharing services to blatantly encourage unlawful copying would be an extreme
result. 114 Thus, despite the justices' differences on the broader issue of the
correct application of the Sony doctrine, 115 the Court held unanimously that the
110. For detailed correlations, see infra Table 2 in Part III.B. Florida Prepaid is the only
case in which Ginsburg cast her vote in a different direction to that of Rehnquist. See Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
111. In the IP database, the correlation between Ginsburg and Stevens is 0.51, the
correlation between Ginsburg and Breyer is 0.58.
112. See Tonja Jacobi, Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formation and Case
Outcome Determination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=947592.
113. See id.
114. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923-25 (2005).
115. The concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Kennedy) would have substantially narrowed the application of the Sony doctrine by adopting a
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defendants were liable for inducing infringement. 16
Also, unanimity in a ruling can mask disagreement in the Court as to the
details of the ruling. For example, in eBay, the Court was of one mind in
holding that a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction against patent
infringement must satisfy the traditional four-factor test focused on "well-
established principles of equity."'1 17 However, the Court was divided as to the
implications of this ruling. Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg) stressed that history suggests that most patent owners would be
entitled to injunctive relief.' 1 8 In contrast, Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) argued that the lessons of history may not apply
because "in many instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the
economic function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike
earlier cases."' 
119
As the Grokster and eBay cases illustrate, citing to unanimous decisions
as evidence against the attitudinal model is unreliable without some
understanding of the underlying status quo that the Court's opinion addresses.
Indeed, once we scratch the surface of the Court's so-called unanimous
decisions, we often see deep underlying differences that do in fact tend to
correlate with the justices' ideological profiles. Ultimately, unanimity is not an
effective measure of the impact of ideology.
There are a number of examples in the IP cases of liberals and
conservatives teaming up to form unusual coalitions and of individual justices
voting against type. However, the existence of such instances does not
fundamentally challenge the attitudinal model.
First, no model is capable of perfectly predicting every case. There may
well be idiosyncratic factors that account for discrepancies between the model
and that which is modeled. 20 A model is useful if it highlights variables that
ratio test in relation to substantial non-infringing use. Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In
contrast, the concurring opinion of Breyer (joined by Stevens and O'Connor) expressly rejected
the application of a ratio test in relation to substantial non-infringing use. Id. at 949 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
116. Id. at 923 (holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties).
117. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that the usual
equitable principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act).
118. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
119. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court's decision in Grokster illustrates a
similar division beneath the edifice of unanimity. In that case, Ginsburg's concurring opinion
(joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy) takes a high-protectionist view; whereas Breyer's concurring
opinion (joined by Stevens and O'Connor) adopts a low protectionist stance. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 942 (2005) (Ginsberg, J., concurring); id. at
949 (Breyer, J., concurring).
120. SEGAL & SPAETH, THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 3, at 32.
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explain a significant amount of the behavior in question. The attitudinal model
is exceptionally successful in this regard, in that it correctly predicts case
outcomes in many issue areas.'
Second, the persuasiveness of any particular case where individual
justices vote against type must be assessed in light of all the other cases where
justices vote in accordance with type. Impressions taken from individual cases
manifest two significant cognitive biases: the fundamental attribution error and
the availability heuristic. The fundamental attribution error describes the human
tendency to overemphasize personality-based explanations for observed
behavior while underemphasizing the role and power of situational influences
on the same behavior. 122 The availability heuristic describes the tendency of
people to overemphasize the significance of vivid, salient or unusual events.'
23
In this context, it is not surprising that IP exceptionalists would point to
examples of voting against type and the strange coalitions they produce.
It is easy to find individual IP cases that show the opposite: justices voting
according to type. Two such cases are the Court's landmark patent decisions in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty124 and Diamond v. Diehr.125 Indeed, Diamond v.
Diehr exactly reflects the ideological composition of the Court at the time.
Figure 2 represents the ideological composition of the Supreme Court in the
1980 term based on the Martin-Quinn scores of judicial ideology for that
year. 126 The majority in Diamond v. Diehr--Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist-continued the expansive reading of the
Patent Act adopted in Chakrabarty, holding that patentable processes could
include mathematical formulas programmed into a digital computer.
127
121. SEGAL & SPAETH, THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 9, at 319
(finding that ideology correctly predicts 77% of justices' votes in search and seizure cases from
1962 to 1998, this constitutes a 30% improvement on the null hypothesis that ideology does not
explain case outcomes); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557, 561 (1989) (finding that ideology
explains 80% ofjustices' votes in civil liberties cases between 1953 and 1988).
122. See Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1977).
123. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH OL. 207 (1973).
124. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
125. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
126. We discuss the Martin-Quinn scores in more detail infra Part III.A.
127. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175. Chakrabarty held that a live, human-made micro-organism is
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303.
Note that in both these cases the conservative justices chose to expand property rights through an
expansive non-textualist reading of the Patent Act. We are grateful to Adam Mossoff for this
insight.
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Figure 2
Judicial Ideology (Martin-Quinn) in the Diamond v. Diehr Court128
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Diamond v. Diehr is a perfect example of justices voting according to
ideological type. But we do not raise this example merely to rebut one
anecdotal observation with another. Rather, our aim is to show that focusing on
individual IP cases where justices form strange coalitions or vote against type
may be misleading; there may be more cases where justices vote as the
attitudinal model predicts, but which do not garner the attention given to cases
with incongruous voting coalitions. More rigorous analysis is required to
determine whether cases producing unusual voting blocs are merely vivid
anecdotes that stand out against a sea of less remarkable voting that is
consistent with the attitudinal model.
C. The Need for an Empirical Approach
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the relevance of ideology to
decision-making in IP cases is ultimately an empirical question. It requires a
comprehensive empirical analysis, rather than an ad hoc impressionistic review
of salient cases. However, until now, there has not been a systematic attempt to
analyze the role of ideology in IP cases in a rigorous empirical fashion.
128. Data: Martin & Quinn, supra note 106.
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III
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we test the relationship between ideology and judicial
decision-making. The theoretical and anecdotal accounts described in the
previous sections suggest two competing views of the relationship between IP
and ideology. The attitudinalist model suggests that support for, and opposition
to, IP claims will be significantly shaped by political ideology. Conversely, the
exceptionalist model claims that the ideological divide typically observed in
Supreme Court cases will not predict the outcomes of IP cases.
In Part III.A we describe the data, dependant variables, control variables,
and independent variables used in our empirical analysis. In Part III.B we
conduct a preliminary analysis of IP exceptionalism by comparing the justice
coalitions usually observed in Supreme Court cases with those found in IP
cases specifically. In Part III.C we then set out our formal testable hypotheses.
In Part III.D we discuss our detailed logistical regression testing of these
hypotheses and the results of our analysis.
A. The Data
To test our hypotheses, we constructed the Supreme Court Intellectual
Property Database.12 9 This database contains a comprehensive set of Supreme
Court opinions dealing with IP from 1954 through 2006. Much of our IP
database is adapted from a widely used database of Supreme Court opinions
developed by Harold Spaeth: The United States Supreme Court Judicial
Database. 130 For simplicity we refer to these databases as the IP database and
the general database, respectively.
We compiled our set of cases by cross-referencing the subject matter
coding in the general database' with a list of IP cases generated through a
129. The Appendix lists the cases contained in our final dataset. See supra app.
130. The general database is available at the Judicial Research Initiative website,
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm. For an assessment of the use of this database, see Lee
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CM. L. REV. 1, 23 (2002). For other studies
using this database, see Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Essay, Dissing States?: Invalidation of
State Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA, L. REV. 1301, 1305 (2002); Frank B. Cross &
Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1437, 1483 (2001); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects
Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005); Epstein & Segal supra note 10; Youngsik
Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices' Decision-making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721
(2000).
13 1. Although the general database contains subject matter codes relating to some areas of
IP-patent (661), copyright (662), trademark (663), and patentability of computer processes (664)
-we found the subject matter coding in the general database to be under-inclusive. For example,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) is coded as "jury trial" rather than
patent and thus falls under the general issue heading of criminal procedure rather than economic
activity. See Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the
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LexisNexis search for the core terms: patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret,
and fair use. 132 In this fashion we avoid solely relying on the classifications in
the general database. The IP database consists of 102 IP cases decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Within those 102 decisions there are 844 separate votes
by the individual justices. The 102 cases in the IP database consist of 52 patent
cases, 26 copyright cases, 20 trademark cases, and 4 trade secret cases. Twelve
of these cases also deal with issues of antitrust law, such as whether IP owners
should be presumed to have market power under the Sherman Act. 133 The
general database constitutes our comparison data. It contains over 8,900 cases
with more than 105,000 separate votes by individual justices.
1. Dependant Variables
The general database records a multitude of attributes for each decision
relating to the origins of the case, the legal subject at issue, key dates such as
the date of oral argument and final decision, the identities of the parties, and the
votes of the individual justices. The database codes the outcome of each
decision either "liberal" or "conservative" according to whether it favored or
disfavored classic liberal underdogs such as the accused in a criminal case, a
person claiming the protection of civil rights, children, indigents, or American
Indians.' 34 We call this variable "Underdog."'135 The general database provides
for these distinctions, and we rely on this widely used external coding for
verification purposes to compare against our primary dependant variable.
In spite of its impressive scope and complexity, the general database is not
adequately detailed in relation to IP. The primary dependant variable in the
Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (2009).
132. We searched LexisNexis for U.S. Supreme Court Cases as follows: core-terms
(copyright) or core-terms (patent) or core-terms (trademark) or core-terms (trade secret) or core-
terms (fair use) and date (geq (01/01/1953) and leq (05/30/2006)). We excluded non-IP cases,
grants of certiorari, and cases dealing solely with the recovery of attorney fees. Note that our core-
terms did not include the right of publicity and thus our database does not include Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment did
not immunize a TV broadcasting company against publicity rights claims by a performer). The
Appendix lists the cases contained in our final dataset.
133. See, e.g., I11. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (holding that
the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support a presumption of market power).
There are eight patent/antirust cases, two copyright/antitrust cases, and two trademark/antitrust
cases.
134. In addition, outcomes favoring affirmative action and reproductive freedom are also
coded as liberal. Pro-union decisions are coded as liberal except in the context of antitrust cases,
where a pro-union decision is regarded as conservative. In cases pertaining to economic activity,
liberal outcomes include pro-competition, anti-business, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-A-vis
large business, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-consumer,
and pro-economic underdog. See generally Spaeth, supra note 38.
135. Spaeth uses the term "liberal." See id. However, to avoid confusion resulting from
multiple uses of"liberal"-applied to cases and justices-we use the term "Underdog."
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general database, Underdog, focuses primarily on the status of the winning
party and is divorced from any ruling as to doctrinal entitlement. Thus, a vote
in an IP case is coded as Underdog if the party favored by the case outcome is
characterized by probable relative disempowerment without considering the
legal claim the party makes. Typical examples include small businesses
prevailing over large businesses or individuals prevailing against the state.
However, determining the effect of ideology on predicting IP outcomes
requires a measure of case outcomes that is relevant to the claim being made.
Specifically, the variable must stipulate the determination in terms of IP. To
correct for this incompatibility, we created a new dependant variable, "PRO-
IP," that records case outcomes in relation to IP. A case is coded as PRO-IP
when it is decided in favor of the party who is asserting the IP right in the
case. 136
For a study such as this, the PRO-IP variable has clear advantages over
the traditional Underdog measure. In a scenario where one large corporate
patent holder sues another similar entity, the Underdog variable provides no
strong intuitive expectation as to how an ideologically driven court should rule.
On the other hand, the PRO-IP variable, which specifies party status in relation
to a legal doctrine, distinguishes between whether the entity is defending or
claiming a property interest. PRO-IP outcomes should therefore correlate with
an expansion or contraction of IP rights. More generally, to the extent that
attitudinalists claim that judges care about case outcomes, they should expect
judges to care about the precedential value of a doctrinal determination, not just
the fate of the specific parties before them in the case at hand. Ordinarily the
attitudinal approach gets at the doctrinal aspect of outcome by subdividing
issue areas-distinguishing between free speech cases in general and free
speech in the context of protests outside abortion clinics, for example.' 37 Since
the general database variable does not provide for this nuance in relation to IP,
it is necessary to create the PRO-IP variable. To ensure the robustness of our
results, we carry out tests on both the Underdog and PRO-IP dependant
136. Although IP cases often involve parties who are both owners of distinct IP rights, only
two of the cases in the IP dataset required the Court to choose between directly conflicting claims
of IP protection. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). In all other cases, the issue before the Court clearly
determined which party was the IP owner in the relevant sense of asserting a claimed IP right. The
Tasini case centered around a conflict between the copyright claims of freelance journalists under
section 106(1) of the Copyright Act and the scope of the reproduction and distribution privilege
accorded to collective work copyright owners, such as the New York Times, by section 201(c). In
Tasini we coded the freelance journalists as the IP owners because they were the original authors
of the works in question. The issue in the CCNV case was whether the sculptor or the party that
commissioned him to make the work of art was the copyright owner under the work made for hire
doctrine. In CCNV we coded the artist as the IP owner because he was the original author of the
work in question.
137. See Spaeth, supra note 38.
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variables.
We did not attempt to code decisions along subjective criteria such as
whether the Court "followed precedent" or created a rule favorable to IP
owners generally. 38 To make that determination requires a subjective analysis
that would raise questions as to the reliability of the data.' 39 Accordingly, the
PRO-IP variable does not capture the differences between the justices in their
many split concurrences.140 Because the PRO-IP variable does not capture this
kind of nuance, it may understate the extent of the differences between the
justices. This only makes our task of rejecting the null hypotheses that ideology
does not affect outcomes in IP cases more difficult.
4 1
2. Control Variables
We supplemented the coding in the general database with additional
variables relevant to IP. We created new control variables relating to case
subject matter (Antitrust, Copyright, Patent, Trademark, and Trade Secret).1
42
Table 1 summarizes a breakdown of the composition of the cases in the IP
databases. The low number of trade secret cases means that we are unlikely to
be able to discern significant results in relation to that area.
In addition to the type of IP variables, we coded IP data according to a
number of other criteria that could potentially determine IP cases. First, to
address the possibility that the justices might be more sympathetic to creators
of IP--differentiating, for instance, between individual inventors on the one
hand and large companies that simply purchase patent portfolios on the other-
we created the variable "Author/Inventor."
138. For a qualitative study of Supreme Court IP cases between 1975 and 2005, see Pamela
Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice
Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831 (2006) (reviewing trends in IP law during Justice Stevens'
tenure on the Supreme Court).
139. See Epstein & King, supra note 130, at 82-97 (discussing the importance of reliability
and validity in data collection and measurement).
140. See supra Part II.B.1.
141. To the extent that the errors are unbiased, this conservative assessment of the
differences between the justices allows us to be more confident of the significance of any
alternative result we find.
142. A control variable is a variable that is held constant in order to analyze the
relationship between other variables without interference.
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Table 1
Case Outcomes in the IP Database, by IP Type
Type of Claim Against IP Owner For IP Owner
Patent 35 16
Copyright 14 11
Trademark 14 5
Trade secret 3 1
Second, there is common doctrinal overlap between IP and antitrust cases.
To address the possibility that IP cases that also involve antitrust issues might
split the justices in an ideological pattern that differs from ordinary IP cases, we
created the variable "Antitrust." The possibility that IP-Antitrust cases differ
systematically from other IP cases arises because those cases are more likely to
hinge on the legitimacy of the exercise of IP rights, rather than questions of
infringement or validity. 143
Third, to address the possibility that the creation of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit had a significant effect on how IP cases are determined,
we created the variable "Post-1982." Congress established the Federal Circuit
in 1982, giving it exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals in order to make
patent law more consistent, reduce forum shopping and (implicitly) to increase
the value of patent rights. 144 The creation of the Federal Circuit changed
substantive patent law and also affected the types of patent cases the Supreme
Court is likely to review.
145
Finally, we use the "Lower Court" variable in the general database to
capture the ideological direction of the lower court decision. The Supreme
Court has a strong tendency to take cases in which it ultimately reverses the
lower court decision. 146 Including this control variable mitigates the potential
selection bias that would otherwise arise from this tendency to reverse.
143. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1813, 1817 (1984).
144. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
145. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme
Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2004).
146. Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into
the "Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 358
(noting that "over the last decade, the Supreme Court reversed 64% of the cases it heard").
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3. Independent Variables: Measures of Ideology
Our statistical analysis, which follows in Part III.D, uses two different
measures of judicial ideology: one simple, one complex. The simple measure is
the party of the appointing president. Commentators often assume that a
judge's ideological leanings can be determined by identifying the party of the
president who appointed that judge to the bench.147 The assumption here is that
Republican presidents are inclined to appoint conservative justices and
Democratic presidents are inclined to appoint liberal ones.
There are, however, reasons to question the validity of using the party of
the appointing president as a measure of judicial ideology. First, presidential
ideology is more nuanced than a simple binary choice between liberal and
conservative. 148 Second, other factors such as the composition of the Senate
and its prevailing norms may either constrain or enhance the power of the
president with respect to judicial appointments. 149 Third, using the party of the
appointing president as a proxy for judicial ideology ignores the possibility that
ideology changes over time. For example, Justice Stevens was appointed by
President Ford, but is now the most liberal member of the Supreme Court.
150
The more complex measure we employ is one developed by Andrew
Martin and Kevin Quinn. 51 Unlike other measures of judicial ideology, the
"Martin-Quinn" scores are derived by actually looking at the votes of the
justices over time.' 52 Martin and Quinn estimated scores for every justice
serving from the 1937 term to the 2005 term using a dynamic item response
theory model. The model takes into account not just case outcomes, but also
voting patterns in each term.'
53
Martin and Quinn designate ideal points, or an estimate of latent
preferences, of each Supreme Court justice by modeling every imaginable
combination of the justices' preferences that could explain the pattern of cases
over their study period of time. 154 Martin and Quinn also leverage voting
147. See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 20; Revesz, supra note 3.
148. See Epstein & King, supra note 130, at 88-89 (noting that on Segal's measure of
presidential economic liberalism, for example, Jimmy Carter is ideologically closer to Richard
Nixon than to Lyndon Johnson).
149. See Tonja Jacobi, The Senatorial Courtesy Game: Explaining the Norm of Informal
Vetoes in Advice and Consent Nominations, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 193 (2005).
150. See supra fig.1.
151. Martin & Quinn, supra note 106.
152. For a discussion of other measures, see Epstein & King, supra note 130, at 95; see
also Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 134-37
(2003).
153. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 106. Item response theory models are mathematical
functions used to estimate the probability of underlying characteristics or latent traits of the
subject of interest, given a set of observed outcomes.
154. A justice's ideal point is his or her most preferred policy position, such that any
change in outcome away from that position reduces that individual's utility.
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coalitions to make inferences about the relative placement of justices. For
example, a justice who is often a lone dissenter in conservative cases will be
ranked as more liberal than a colleague in the minority of a 7-2 conservative
decision.
This measure allows for standardized comparisons over time, using the
manifold crossovers between justices' tenures to compare justices who were
never on the Court together. Thus the rank order measure simultaneously
accounts for change over time and across justices for all years, and therefore
renders the ideal points of the justices a standardized comparison of justices
with one another over time. The dynamic nature of the Martin-Quinn scores,
which allow individual justices' scores to change over time, makes this
measure of ideology more realistic than other measures that hold justices'
ideology constant.1 55 It is essential that the measure of the justices' ideal points
rests on a standardized scale for our purposes because our analysis follows IP
cases over half a century. Although the method used to derive the Martin-
Quinn scores is quite complex, the scores themselves align closely with press
and popular perceptions of the ideological positions of the justices-in other
words, the scores "look right."'
156
Using the Martin-Quinn scores derived from Supreme Court cases as a
measure of ideology with respect to those same cases might raise questions of
circularity in some contexts. However, Martin and Quinn have shown that there
is minimal concern with circularity in using scores developed from cases to
predict voting behavior, since rerunning the analysis with any given issue area
excluded has a minimal effect on the resulting scores. 157 Nevertheless, to be
certain to avoid any circularity problems, we conducted our analysis using a
version of the Martin-Quinn scores that excludes IP cases from the ideology
score derivation procedure.' 
58
Using specialized Martin-Quinn scores that exclude IP cases has an added
advantage for our analysis. Although Martin-Quinn scores are typically used as
measures of judicial ideology, the measure simply assumes that a single
dimension is operative in Supreme Court decision-making; it makes no
155. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When,
and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007).
156. In 2004 Justice O'Connor held the median position with a Martin-Quinn score of 0.08;
with her retirement and the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy occupies the
median position with a Martin-Quinn score of 0.49. Media portraits of Justice Kennedy as the new
"swing vote" on the Court fit very well with Martin and Quinn's analysis. See, e.g., Robert
Barnes, In Second Term, Roberts Court Defines Itself WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at A3; Robert
Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle, WASH. PosT, May 13, 2007,
at Al.
157. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Can Ideal Point Estimate be Used as
Explanatory Variables? (Martin-Quinn Scores, Working Paper 2005), available at
http://mqscores.wustl.edu/media/resnote.pdf.
158. We are indebted to Andrew Martin for creating this unique data for us.
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assumption that the dimension is necessarily ideological. 159 Generally, the
Martin-Quinn scores are treated as scores of ideology because it has been
shown that judicial decision-making in many areas of law can be predicted by
how the judges vote in other areas. This gets to the heart of the definition of
ideology: an overarching framework that consistently predicts people's views
in one area, based on their views in other areas. If we can show that the
outcomes in IP cases are predictable, given how judges vote in other areas of
law, then we will have established that judicial ideology is a determinant in IP
cases. Even if the reader rejects this definition of ideology, establishing this
effect will nonetheless show the hollowness of the exceptionalist claim that IP
cases are not explicable and predictable by the same factors that determine case
outcomes in other areas of the law.
B. Impressionistic Results
We begin with the descriptive analysis of the correlations between the
justices in the general Spaeth database and our specialized IP database. This
analysis is by no means definitive, but it does provide a preliminary test of
whether IP looks significantly different from other areas of the law, and
directly addresses some of the arguments raised in favor of IP exceptionalism.
This comparison confirms the anecdotal observations discussed in Part II that
there are unusually high correlations among the justices in IP cases when
compared to Supreme Court cases generally.
Table 2 provides correlations among the justices on the Rehnquist Court,
for both the general database and the IP database. Each cell contains two
numbers: the number on the left is the correlation between the applicable
justices in the general database; the number on the right is the correlation
between the same two justices in the IP database. We test for both whether we
can be confident (at least at the 0.05 level of significance) of the accuracy of
each set of correlations, and whether there is a significant difference between
each pair of correlations in the general and the IP database. For example,
Ginsburg and Rehnquist have a correlation of 0.42 in the general database,
which is significant, and a correlation of 0.91 in the IP database, which is also
159. Farnsworth has recently commented on what he perceives to be a limitation of the
Martin-Quinn scores: the notion that judicial policy preferences can be arrayed along a single
ideological spectrum. Farnsworth argues that the Martin-Quinn Scores assume rather than prove
the attitudinal model. See Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess
Supreme Court Justices, with Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 143 (2007), available at http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2007/l 1/. In fact, although Martin and Quinn assume that a single dimension
is operative in Supreme Court decision-making, as discussed they make no assumption that the
dimension is necessarily ideological. The chances are vanishingly small that the model used by
Martin and Quinn could be made to work if their assumption of a single dimension was seriously
flawed.
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significant; furthermore, the difference between these two numbers is also
significant.
Table 2
Correlations between Justices in the General Database and the IP Database'
60
Justice Stevens Ginsburg Breyer Souter O'Connor Kennedy Rehnquist Scalia
Ginsburg .66 1.50
Breyer .62 1'83 .75 1.65
Souter .62 .65 .80 1.92" .73 1.74
O'Connor .46 1.51 .541.83" .58 1.70 .611.93"
Kennedy .411.48 .511.84" .45 1.47 .57 1.79" .661.80
Rehnquist .38 1.53 .421.91" .401.49 .501.84"" .691.75 .741.80
Scalia .301.62" .371.85"" .271.66" .441.93" .571.88" .691.71 .701.94"Thomas .22 1.59' 1.321.85"" .23 I .38 1.93" .4531 1.00 .601.87 .68 -1.92" O I1.00
As expected, given the large number of cases, all correlations in the
general database are significant at the 0.01 level. Even though there are far
fewer cases, all correlations in the IP database are significant at the 0.01 level
except for the following: Rehnquist-Breyer, Kennedy-Breyer and Stevens-
Kennedy, which are significant at the 0.05 level, and Thomas-O'Connor and
Thomas-Scalia, which has no computable p-value because their votes are
identical.
Twenty-two of the thirty-six pairs of the correlations in the general
database are significantly different from their counterpart correlations in the IP
database. Strikingly, all of the statistically significant differences between the
IP data and the general data indicate a higher correlation between pairs of
justices in the IP data.
The lowest correlation in the IP data is Kennedy-Stevens at 0.48,
compared to the lowest correlation in the general data, Thomas-Stevens at 0.22.
Ten justice pairs have significant correlations over 0.90 in the IP data; eighteen
pairs have correlations over 0.80. There are no correlations above 0.80 in the
general data. These correlation patterns are further reflected in the high level of
160. Data: Harold J. Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database,
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm.
All correlations in the general database are significant at the 0.01 level. All correlations in the
IP database are significant at the 0.01 level, except: Rehnquist-Breyer, Kennedy-Breyer and
Stevens-Kennedy, each significant at the 0.05 level; and Thomas-O'Connor and Thomas-Scalia,
for which there is perfect collinearity.
* Difference between correlations is significant at the 0.05 level.
** Difference between correlations is significant at the 0.01 level. At the 0.05 level we can
have 95% confidence that the results are not the product of a random effect. At the 0.01
significance level, the confidence is 99%.
# Approximated p-values, where the correlation in IP database is assumed 0.999 and not
1.000. The correlation comparison formula is based on the conversion of correlations into Fisher
z-scores, which are undefined for p=1.000.
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unanimous decisions in IP cases, as discussed above, and may suggest a
broader level of consensus generally in IP cases.'
61
The only correlations that were lower in the IP data than the general data
were Ginsburg-Stevens (0.50 as opposed to 0.66) and Ginsburg-Breyer (0.65 as
opposed to 0.75). Neither of these differences is statistically significant.
Stevens and Breyer are unusual in being the only two justices whose
correlations with the majority of other justices are not significantly higher in
the IP database.
Together, these effects show that there are unusually high correlations
among the justices' votes in IP cases when compared to the general database,
but that the increased agreement among the justices is lower for some of the
liberal justices. Both of these effects provide some support, albeit
impressionistic, to the claim that the usual coalitions that we see on the
Supreme Court in the general data are not replicated in IP cases. This evidence
provides some support for the claim that IP may in fact be exceptional; whether
this means that the outcomes of IP are not amenable to prediction on the basis
of traditional definitions of judicial ideology remains to be seen. The evidence
also lends credence to the claim that the extent of the effect of ideology may be
significantly different for liberal and conservative justices.'
62
The following section lays out our hypotheses. These hypotheses will
allow us to test whether the impressionistic evidence is in fact supported by
more rigorous analysis.
C. Hypotheses
The attitudinalist theory would predict that judges' ideology will be
significantly related to their voting behavior in IP cases.' 63 Establishing this
result would suggest that the noteworthy cases that seemed to defy ideological
explanations are outliers, given undue attention because of their salience. The
exceptionalist theory, in contrast, would predict that we will not see a
significant relationship between ideology and judicial votes in IP cases.164
Using judicial vote as the unit of analysis, our first formal hypothesis is that
judicial ideology predicts judicial decision-making in IP cases.
The theory explored in Part I also suggested that we might fail to find an
effect for ideology in relation to IP because of differences between the various
subfields of IP. 165 In other words, differences between copyright, patent,
trademark, and trade secret could raise competing concerns that cut across the
161. See supra Part II.A.1.
162. See supra Part I.B.
163. See supra Part I.A.
164. See supra Part I.B.
165. See supra Part I.B.4.
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usual liberal and conservative ideological camps. To test this proposition, we
ascertain whether, to the extent there is an effect of ideology on IP case
outcomes, it is undermined when we examine areas of IP separately.
Consequently, our second hypothesis is that the effect of judicial ideology is
affected by the type of IP right at issue.
The same body of theory also suggests that the ideological ambiguity of
IP may be more pronounced in either the liberal or the conservative camp. For
example, it is possible that ideology does not answer IP questions for
conservatives, as they may be divided on the threshold question of whether IP
is property or on the correct balance between property rights and free
competition. Alternately, liberal justices who value free speech might divide on
how to balance freedom of expression with protecting consumers from
confusion (trademark) or providing incentives to authors (copyright). Although
these effects are driven by similar causes, they may be independent. For
example, conservatives may oscillate between supporting property rights and
supporting free-market liberalism, but liberals may consistently favor free
speech, or vice versa. In the previous section, we found preliminary evidence
suggesting that liberals may be more divided on IP issues than conservatives.
To assess this claim, the third hypothesis we test is that the extent of the effect
of ideology on judicial voting behavior differs between liberals and
conservatives.
If there is a significant positive relationship between judicial voting
behavior in IP cases and ideology, the next natural question would be whether
the effect is as strong as it is for all other cases before the Supreme Court. To
ascertain this, the fourth hypothesis we test is whether the extent of the effect of
ideology on IP case outcomes is less pronounced than the effect of ideology on
the entire population of Supreme Court cases.
In summary, our four hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1. Judicial ideology predicts judicial decision-making in IP
cases.
Hypothesis 2. The effect of judicial ideology is affected by the type of
IP right at issue.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of judicial ideology differs between liberals
and conservatives.
Hypothesis 4. The effect of judicial ideology in IP cases is less
pronounced than in other Supreme Court cases.
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D. Statistical Testing of Intellectual Property Exceptionalism
1. Methodology
Given that our data consists of the "for or against" votes of individual
justices, we must use a method of regression that can calculate probabilistic
effects on dichotomous outcomes. That is, we need a method that can estimate
incremental probabilities from data that is essentially comprised of "reverse" or
"affirm" votes. The two primary methods for doing this are logit and probit. 66
We report logit results, but we have also verified our results using probit, and
the results are substantively the same. Logit coefficients do not have an
intuitive meaning unless they are converted into either odds ratios or
probabilities.' 67 We provide both odds and probability translations to
demonstrate the substantive meaning of our results.
It is important to note that the general statistical assumption that each
observation is independent is not appropriate when the observations are the
votes of the justices. Even though justices often disagree, they are each
observing the same facts and the same arguments in any given case, and thus
their votes are likely to be correlated. Therefore, we relax the independence
assumption.1
68
166. Logit and probit are both designed for estimation of binary outcomes; they vary with
respect to the assumptions made about the distribution of the error tenn. Whereas logit assumes a
logistic distribution, probit assumes a normal distribution.
167. The reason for this is that a logit coefficient represents a movement along a non-linear
scale; consequently the effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable will depend on the
point at which the change occurs. Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the
Results of Empirical Studies, Part !, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2006).
168. We do so by adjusting the standard errors given the heteroskedastic and clustered
structure of the data. That is, these are mechanisms of accounting for the possible lack of
independence between cases and over time. We undertake three variations of estimation, with
Huber-White standard errors, with standard errors clustered by judges and clustered by cases. See
Peter J. Huber, The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates Under Nonstandard Conditions,
in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND
PROBABILITY 221 (1967), available at http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?
view=body&id=pdf.l&handle=euclid.bsmsp/1200512988; William. Rogers, sg17: Regression
Standard Errors in Clustered Samples, 13 STATA TECHNICAL BULL. 19 (1983); Halbert White, A
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for
Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817 (1980). William Roger's robust estimator of the
covariance matrix of the estimates may be considered an extension of Peter Huber's earlier
formula. Clustering helps mitigate the underestimation of standard errors-a typical hazard in
panel data-and reduces the risk of rejecting a true null. For similar approaches, see, for example,
Julie Agnew et al., Portfolio Choice and Trading in a Large 401(k) Plan, 93 AM. EcON. REV. 193
(2003); John Core & Wayne Guay, Stock-Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees, 61 J. FIN.
ECON. 253 (2001). The most effective way to factor our judge- and case-level heterogeneity
entirely would be to use fixed-effects estimation. In our data, however, using fixed-effects is not
possible as it may lead to systematic selection, since all observations related to cases with
unanimous decisions and to judges who voted strictly in one direction would be dropped. More
important, given the dramatic reduction in the number of observations and small group sizes,
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2. The Significance of Ideology in Intellectual Property Cases
Our first hypothesis predicted that a justice's votes in IP cases will be
significantly affected by his or her ideology. Our initial regression analysis
shows that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between a
justice's ideology and the extent to which he or she votes in favor of the IP
owner. The more conservative the justice (and thus the higher the Martin-Quinn
score) the more likely he or she is to favor the IP owner. Using the Martin-
Quinn scores as our measure of judicial ideology, we derived a logit coefficient
of 0.14 in the direction predicted (with a standard error of 0.04). Using our
alternative measure of ideology, the party of the appointing president, we
derived a logit coefficient of 0.47 in the direction predicted (with a standard
error of 0.17). These results establish that a conservative justice is significantly
more likely than a liberal justice to vote to uphold an IP claim.
The conclusion that ideology shapes IP case outcomes holds regardless of
whether ideology is measured in terms of Martin-Quinn scores or simply the
party of the appointing president. We can also confirm the consistency of
Martin-Quinn scores with party of the appointing president by investigating the
effect of these measures on the more traditional measure of case outcomes,
Underdog. Here again the results are consistent. The Underdog coefficient
using Martin-Quinn scores is 0.22 in the direction predicted (with a standard
error of 0.04). The Underdog coefficient using the party of the appointing
president is 0.39 in the direction predicted (with a standard error of 0.17). We
use the terminology "in the direction predicted" to avoid confusion over
positive and negative values. In each case, the more liberal the justice, the more
likely he or she is to vote in favor of the Underdog.
When using both measures of judicial ideology together, the Martin-
Quinn coefficient remains significant in the direction predicted throughout and
completely absorbs the explanatory power of the party of the appointing
president measure. Additionally, we ran the same tests using a measure of each
justice's prior voting history, determined by using either the count or the
fraction of judicial votes against the IP owner for each justice over the five
years prior to the focal year or over all preceding years. Although prior voting
history is also a significant predictor of future voting when run independently,
when combined with the Martin-Quinn scores, the history measure became
insignificant while leaving the effect of Martin-Quinn scores intact. These
additional analyses show that establishing the effect of ideology is not
fixed-effects would pose an incidental parameter problem, or the hazard of inconsistent estimates
resulting from a small number of cases used to estimate a large number of parameters. See, e.g., J.
Neyman & Elizabeth L. Scott, Consistent Estimates Based on Partially Consistent Observations,
16 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1948); Tony Lancaster, The Incidental Parameters Problem Since 1948, 95
J. ECONOMETRICS 391 (2000). Most results are substantively similar using all three variations of
estimation, so we report Huber-White standard errors except where otherwise specified.
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contingent upon use of one particular score of ideology.
Moreover, these additional analyses using a variety of measures of
ideology indicate that, although the Martin-Quinn scores are congruent with the
same broad effect of ideological preferences and consistency, they are
empirically more refined and reflect a more precise estimate of ideology than
the alternative proxies. This is an important result for the study of judicial
ideology more broadly, suggesting that Martin-Quinn scores should generally
be preferred as a measure of judicial ideology on the U.S. Supreme Court.
Consequently, the remainder of our analysis uses only the Martin-Quinn scores
as a measure of ideology.
We have shown that there is a significant relationship between IP
outcomes and ideology, but how substantive is this effect? We can answer this
question by converting our logit coefficients into expected changes in the odds
that a justice will vote in favor of an IP claim. Martin-Quinn scores of ideology
are theoretically unbounded, but their actual historical range is from -6.33 at the
extreme liberal end to 4.31 at the extreme conservative end. 169 The difference
between a justice at the liberal extreme and a justice at the conservative
extreme translates to a 79% increase in the odds of voting for the IP owner.
v7
Thus the difference between strong liberals and strong conservatives translates
to a massive difference in the likelihood of supporting an IP claim. This effect
is not limited to the extremes. A move from one standard deviation below the
historical mean ideology score (-2.33) to one standard deviation above the
mean (2.19) increases the odds of voting for the IP owner by 48%. To put this
in context, the same movement decreases the odds of voting Underdog by 63%.
Specifically for the Rehnquist Court, moving the ideological distance
from Justice Stevens at the liberal end of the Court to Justice Thomas on the
conservative end translates to a 51% increase in the odds of voting for the IP
owner. The increase in ideological conservatism from Justice Stevens to Justice
O'Connor at the median of the Court translates to a 30% increase in the odds of
voting for the IP owner. Similarly, the increase in conservatism from Justice
O'Connor to Justice Thomas at the conservative end of the Court translates to a
29% increase in the odds of voting for the IP owner. 171
We can also perform the same analysis in terms of our other measure of
ideology, the party of the appointing president. The odds of a justice voting for
the IP owner increase 37.5% if the justice was appointed by a Republican, as
opposed to a Democratic president. These results show that ideology has both a
169. These are the Martin-Quinn scores for Justice Douglas in the 1974 term and Justice
Rehnquist in the 1975 term.
170. It is important to remember that these figures describe changes in conditional
probabilities, not absolute probabilities. For example, a 79% reduction in the odds of voting PRO-
IP would move an outcome from 80% to 17% (= 80 - 79% of 80), not from 80% to 1%.
171. Based on the tenure average Martin-Quinn scores for each justice.
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highly statistically significant and large substantive effect on the propensity of
justices to vote for an IP claim.
3. The Effect of Ideology on Different Types of Intellectual Property
Thus far, we have drawn no distinctions between the various types of IP:
patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. These areas are different in a
number of respects, and so it is worth exploring whether the effect of ideology
is contingent upon a particular subset of IP cases. For example, conservative
judges might be expected to be less amenable to patent and trademark claims,
given that both plaintiffs and defendants in patent and trademark cases are often
businesses. In contrast, liberal judges might be expected to be less amenable to
copyright claims that pit the commercial interests of large companies against a
diverse range of less powerful individuals with an interest in free expression.
To explore the potential distinctions between different types of IP, we
estimated two different models of the effect of ideology on IP cases using
Martin-Quinn scores. Model I includes variables relating to the type of IP at
issue in each case. We tested the effect of ideology, accounting for the
individual effects of copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, using patents as
our default category, since approximately half of the cases in the IP database
involve patents. In Model 2, we added interaction terms between our measure
of ideology and each type of IP to test the conditionality of our earlier results
on type of IP.
Both models show that IP case outcomes are significantly related to
ideology. In fact, the coefficient on ideology remains substantively identical to
our earlier result,172 confirming that the effect of ideology is not a result of
other factors, such as type of IP.
Model I tested the effect of different types of IP. Our regression analysis
showed that the justices were significantly more likely to vote for the IP owner
in copyright cases compared to the default category of patent cases (p <
0.01).173 We did not find any statistically significant differences at the 0.05
level between trademark and patent, or trade secret and patent.
Figure 3, below, provides a visualization of the differences between types
of IP. This figure depicts the logit-derived predicted probability of a justice
voting for the IP owner mapped against the Martin-Quinn ideology scores. The
Figure graphs the Martin-Quinn ideological scores for the historical range of
that variable's scale on the x-axis and the probability of voting for the IP owner
on the y-axis.
172. See supra Part III.D.2 (reporting a coefficient of 0.14). In Model I the logit coefficient
was 0.13 with a standard error of 0.04; in Model 2 the logit coefficient was 0.12 with a standard
error of 0.06.
173. Again, this result holds across all model specifications.
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Figure 3 illustrates the effect of ideology on the probability of voting for
the IP owner, by IP type, when the lower court voted in a conservative
direction.174 It shows that justices are significantly more likely to vote for an IP
owner in copyright cases when compared to other types of IP. For instance, at
the zero point on the Martin-Quinn ideology score, the probability of a justice
voting for the IP owner in patent, trademark, and trade secret cases is 24.4%. In
contrast, the equivalent probability for the copyright cases is 40.3%. This
divergence increases slightly as justices become more conservative.
Figure 3
Predicted Probability of Voting For IP Owner, by Type of IP
WLo
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The difference between the effect of ideology in copyright cases and
patent cases is open to a number of possible explanations. Both copyright and
patent law establish private rights of exclusion in order to give authors and
inventors an incentive to create. However, copyright and patent differ in several
important respects. First, although copyright defendants incur liability for
infringement only if they have copied a copyrighted work, many patent
defendants have independently invented their products. Second, Supreme Court
justices are masters of the written word and so might be more sympathetic to
174. Here we are simply using the Underdog variable to control for the direction of the
lower court decision. The figure does not look materially different without this control.
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the romantic myth of the author underlying copyright than they would be to the
equivalent myth of the inventor in patent law. Both of these factors suggest that
the justices may simply be more sympathetic to the claims of an author against
a copier than they are to the claims of one inventor against a second inventor or
rival producer. If true, these explanations imply that the justices respond more
favorably to the incentive theory underlying copyright protection than that
underlying patent protection. An alternative possibility is that the justices
perceive no difference in the incentive logic of patents versus copyrights, but
are less concerned with over-breadth in copyright law because of its many
exceptions and limitations.175
The apparent difference between copyright and patent cases begs the
question whether the effect of ideology on IP is contingent on type of IP. That
is, are the types of IP different, but all driven by ideology, or are they different
because only some are driven by ideology? To investigate this question further,
we added interaction terms between our measure of ideology and each type of
IP in Model 2. None of the interaction terms were significant, which indicates
that the impact of ideology on voting in favor of the IP owner is not driven by
one particular type of IP case alone. Ideology significantly affects all types of
IP.
The difference between copyright and patent cases should not be
misinterpreted. The slope of the curves in Figure 3 demonstrates that the effect
of ideology on copyright cases is very similar to all other cases. The only
difference is that for any given ideology score, the predicted probability that a
justice will vote in favor of the IP claimant is greater in a copyright case. This
is apparent from the fact that the intercept of the copyright curve is higher than
the other curves in Figure 3.
Taken together, these results show that the effect of ideology exists in
every type of IP case to a significant degree, but the level of the propensity to
vote in favor of the IP owner depends on the type of IP dispute. In other words,
although the effect of ideology is uniformly significant for all types of IP cases,
and is not amplified or attenuated by type of IP, the predicted probability of
voting for the IP owner for any level of ideological score varies, at least
between copyright and patent cases. This suggests that although ideology is
highly consequential, legal and factual elements may also be highly
determinative. 176
175. Compare, for example, the broad scope of the fair use doctrine in copyright law with
the narrow scope of the experimental use defense in patent law. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 219-20 (2003).
176. This is consistent with some attitudinal literature. For example, Segal & Spaeth's
analysis of Supreme Court search and seizure decisions from 1962 to 1998 shows that although
overall the Court voted in a liberal direction in 36% of cases, factors such as the location of the
search, the timing of the search and the presence or absence of a warrant affected that result
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4. Other Differences: Antitrust, Author-Inventor, and the Creation of the
Federal Circuit
In addition to type of IP, we added control variables for other potentially
significant legal and factual elements of IP cases. In particular we tested the
effect of controlling for Author/Inventor, Antitrust, and Post-1982. 77 We
discuss our findings in relation to these variables below.
First, we found no statistically significant effect for the Author/Inventor
variable. This indicates the effect of ideology on IP cases is not affected by
whether a case is brought by an author or an inventor, as opposed to a non-
creative owner.
Second, we found only weak results for the effect of our Post-1982
variable, which was intended to capture the possible influence of the creation of
the Federal Circuit. The Post-1982 variable is significant at the 0.05 level when
not controlling for lower court direction, but the variable is not significant with
this control. One interpretation of this result is that it reflects a paradigm shift
in the attitude of the Court to IP in the 1980s that coincides with the creation of
the Federal Circuit. On this view, the creation of the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court's increased receptivity to IP claimants are both manifestations
of a broader trend: recognition of the increased importance of the information
economy and IP to American competitiveness. However, because this result is
not sustained once we control for the direction of the lower court decision, the
findings are more consistent with the view that Supreme Court review of
Federal Circuit cases is motivated by the perceived need to rein in the Federal
Circuit's excessive formalism, rather than to change the rights of IP owners per
178
se.
Finally, we also found only weak results with respect to our Antitrust
variable. Antitrust is significant just outside of the traditional 0.05 standard
using robust standard errors, but not when clustering by case or by judge. This
result suggests that there may be some ideologically relevant difference
between IP cases, which typically focus on issues of validity and infringement,
and IP-Antitrust cases, which focus instead on the legitimacy of the exercise of
IP rights. However, our confidence in the reliability of this difference is
marginal; because these results disappear when clustering, some other factor
common to antitrust cases may account for the apparent difference of those
cases.
considerably. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 316-20.
177. For a description of these control variables, see supra Part III.A.2.
178. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabuskihilo Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
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Overall, these results raise interesting doctrinal implications for IP. Some
elements common to IP cases that one might consider determinative in case
outcomes are at best marginally significant. The creation of the Federal Circuit,
the interaction between IP and antitrust, and the status of the owner of the IP
rights all fall to an insignificant level when ideology and the direction of the
lower court's decision have been accounted for. This suggests that ideology is
not only a significant predictor of outcomes in IP cases, but that it appears to
overshadow many important legal elements.
The only legal distinction of consistent and strong significance is that
between copyright and patent. Justices across the entire ideological spectrum
are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the IP owner in a given
copyright case than in a given patent case. We have proposed a number of
possibilities as to why this difference arises: differences in judicial attitudes to
patent and copyright's restrictive incentive systems, differences in the nature of
authorship and invention, or differences in the balance between IP protection
and its limitations. The most striking result is that the effect of ideology
remains highly significant when many other potential predictors of justices'
voting are accounted for.
Next we test the possibility raised in the theoretical discussion of IP
exceptionalism, and also suggested by the impressionistic results: that the effect
of ideology may be different for conservative as opposed to liberal justices.
5. Differentiating the Effect of Ideology for Liberals and Conservatives
Our analysis so far shows that ideology-measured along the traditional
liberal-conservative spectrum-is significantly related to the likelihood of
voting in favor of an IP claim. However, the theoretical ideological ambiguity
of IP addressed earlier raises the question of whether we should expect this
effect to be uniform across the ideological spectrum.
To see whether the effect of ideology in IP cases is different for liberal
and conservative justices, we use a statistical technique called spline regression,
which allows us to examine the effect of ideology on different groups of
justices separately. 179 Spline decomposition is a powerful analytical tool
because it allows us to compare the effects of liberal and conservative ideology
while retaining the statistical power of the entire sample of cases.' 
80
179. For a thorough discussion of complex regression models, see JACK JOHNSTON & JOHN
DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS (4th ed. 1997). For an application of a spline regression, see
Ranjay Gulati & Maxim Sytch, Dependence Asymmetry and Joint Dependence in
Interorganizational Relationships: Effects of Embeddedness on a Manufacturer's Performance in
Procurement Relationships, 52 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 32 (2007).
180. A spline allows the regression to have two separate slopes--one liberal, one
conservative-without confining any given justice to the category of liberal or conservative. This
maintains the maximum amount of data. We use simultaneous estimation on the logit equations
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We divided our data into two groups, liberal and conservative, based on
their Martin-Quinn scores. We chose a Martin-Quinn of zero as the dividing
line between liberal and conservative justices.' 81 The zero point on the Martin-
Quinn ideology scale provides the most intuitive cut point at which to
distinguish liberals from conservatives for two reasons. First, zero is the
assumed prior for each justice's ideal point under the method Martin and Quinn
used to create their scores in the first place.' Second, zero turns out to be very
close to the actual historical mean of the Martin-Quinn ideology scores used in
our analysis (the historical mean is -0.0 1).
Our spline regression analysis shows that there is indeed a difference
between how ideology affects conservative and liberal justices in IP cases.
When viewed in isolation, the effect of ideology on IP case outcomes is only
significant for conservative justices.' 83 The same analysis shows no apparent
effect of ideology on IP case outcomes for liberals alone. Should we conclude
that the conservative justices of the Supreme Court are ideologically driven but
that the liberal justices are not? When we ran the same spline analysis with
respect to the effect of ideology on voting for the Underdog, we found that both
the liberal and conservative splines were significant. Thus it would be unsound
to suggest that liberal justices are generally non-ideological; our analysis using
the traditional Underdog measure of case outcomes indicates the contrary.
These results confirm the preliminary conclusion we reached based on our
impressionistic evidence: there is a difference in the extent to which ideology
affects conservative and liberal justices in IP cases. In this spline regression
analysis the role of ideology in voting in favor of the IP owner is significant
only for conservatives; the effect for liberals is not differentiable from zero. We
discuss these findings in greater detail in the implications section.
6. The Relative Impact of Ideology on Intellectual Property
Having established that ideology has a significant effect on the probability
of voting in favor of the IP owner-albeit an effect that itself is differentiated
by ideology-the final element of our inquiry is to determine whether ideology
shapes IP to the same extent that it shapes other cases. We examine this
question in two ways. First, we analyze the interaction of ideology and IP in the
for each spline and a joint variance-covariance matrix to account for possible correlation among
structural errors.
181. More technically, the conservative spline was recoded to equal the Martin-Quinn
score if the justice's score was greater than or equal to zero, and was set to zero if otherwise.
Likewise, the liberal spline was set equal to the Martin-Quinn score only if the justice's score was
below zero, and constrained to zero otherwise.
182. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 106.
183. The coefficient was 0.19 in the direction predicted. The effect is significant at the 0.05
level using robust standard errors and robust standard errors clustered by case. However, the effect
is only marginally significant when clustering by judge, where p = 0.07.
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general database. Second, we analyze the effect of ideology on voting for the
Underdog in IP cases and in non-IP cases from the general database.
Our first test was to run a regression with Underdog as the dependent
variable and with: (1) ideology; (2) a dichotomous (or dummy) IP variable;' 84
and (3) an interaction term between the IP and ideology variables, in the
general database. This test compares IP cases to all other cases, and determines
whether ideology as applied to IP is significantly different from ideology
generally. Thus, if the interaction term is significant, then there is a significant
difference between the role of ideology in IP cases and other cases.
The results show that ideology remains significant, but the interaction
term is also highly significant (the coefficient was 0.10 with a standard error of
0.04). The interaction term is negative, while the ideology term is positive: this
shows that the effect of ideology is weaker in IP cases compared to other cases,
because the negative interaction term weakens the positive effect of ideology
on the probability of voting PRO-IP. This difference gives some support to the
claim that IP differs from other areas of the law. However, the continued
significance of ideology belies the stronger exceptionalist claim that IP cases
are not explicable by reference to judicial ideology.
Interestingly, the IP variable is also positive and significant. Since Martin-
Quinn scores give liberal justices negative scores and conservative justices
positive scores, the positive IP result suggests that justices are more likely to
vote for the Underdog in IP cases than they are in other types of cases the Court
hears. This lends further support to the claim that IP cases are different from
other cases. However, as in all of our tests, ideology remains significant in this
test, confirming the predictive power of ideology in IP cases. Again, this shows
that IP is not immune to the effects of ideology, even though IP does seem to
be somewhat less influenced by ideology than are other areas of the law. This
combination of results also arises in our second test of the extent of the effect
of ideology.
The second question, the difference in the effect of ideology in voting for
the Underdog in IP and non-IP cases, cannot be addressed with a direct
comparison; that would be like comparing "whether a particular line is longer
than a particular rock is heavy."' 185 One cannot compare different dependant
variables in different databases. We also cannot compare PRO-IP in both
databases, because there is no vote in relation to IP in non-IP cases. What we
can do, however, is estimate the relative effect of ideology on voting Underdog
in the IP database compared to the effect of voting Underdog in non-IP cases
184. A dummy variable is a simple 1/0 coding of whether a given data point fits in a given
category. Here, any case concerning IP is coded IP=1, all other cases are coded 1P=0.
185. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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from the general database.
We find a similar disparity as in the tests of the first question. The effect
of ideology on voting Underdog in IP cases is lower than the effect of ideology
on voting Underdog in non-IP cases. The difference is statistically significant at
the 0.05 level. The difference between the effect of ideology for IP cases (0.24)
and all other cases (0.33) is highly statistically significant (p = 0.02). Moving
from one end of the historical ideological spectrum to the other (-6.33 to 4.31)
decreases the odds of voting Underdog in the general database by nearly 97%.
In the IP database, that move reduces the odds of voting Underdog by 92%.
In sum, both tests provide strong evidence that ideology is statistically
significant in its effect on IP cases, but at significantly lower levels than in non-
IP Supreme Court cases. The interaction of ideology and IP in the general
database is highly significant, which indicates that the effect of ideology is
weaker in IP cases compared to other cases. We also found that difference
when comparing the probability of voting for the Underdog in IP cases versus
non-IP cases. The effect of ideology on voting for the Underdog in IP cases is
significantly lower than the effect of ideology on voting for the Underdog in
non-IP cases. 86 Both of these tests confirm that judicial ideology has a
statistically significant effect on the outcomes of IP cases, but at significantly
lower levels than in non-IP Supreme Court cases. Thus in answer to our
question of whether ideology shapes IP, or conversely whether IP is
exceptional, we have seen that ideology has both a statistically and
substantively significant effect on the probability of voting for or against the IP
owner. These last results show that although it is true that ideology is highly
determinative of IP outcomes, there is still merit to the claim that IP is different
from other cases, if not entirely exceptional.
IV
IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This Article has shown that the common claim among IP scholars and
practitioners that liberal-conservative ideological division plays no role in
determining IP case outcomes is erroneous. As our statistical analysis has
shown, ideology is a significant determinant of whether an individual justice
will vote for or against an IP owner. In other words, attitudes about IP are part
of the liberal-conservative ideological continuum, not an exception to it.,
87
These results raise significant implications for both IP jurisprudence and the
study of judicial ideology.
186. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
187. Note that although our analysis in Part III.D.5 only found a statistically significant
effect for conservatives, our general findings apply to both ends of the ideological spectrum.
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Our central finding, that ideology affects outcomes in IP cases, is
significant for the IP community in a number of respects. First, not only are our
findings contrary to the orthodoxy of the IP community, they are also contrary
to the limited empirical evidence that had been available until now. Prior
research addressing the relationship between IP and ideology focused on
particular narrow issues within IP-the application of the Polaroid factors in
trademark cases and patent claim construction appeals-and found no effect. 1 88
In contrast, our broad-based study of all areas of IP establishes a clear
relationship between ideology and voting patterns in the context of Supreme
Court decisions.
Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that factors beyond ideology are
also significant. In particular, we found that the justices were significantly more
likely to vote for the IP owner in copyright cases compared to patent cases. We
also found some evidence that the justices were more inclined to side with the
IP claimant after the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.
The Supreme Court has been unusually active in patent law in the last few
years. Between 2002 and 2007, the Court decided nine patent cases.' 8' The
Court ruled on seven of these cases in 2006 and 2007 alone. 190 The Court's
renewed interest in patents arguably reflects both the crisis of confidence in the
U.S. patent system and a belief that the Federal Circuit has strayed too far from
191Supreme Court authority in recent years. Although these recent cases provide
strong impressionistic evidence of another shift in the Supreme Court's attitude
with respect to IP (or at least with respect to patents), there is at present not
enough data to assess this trend statistically. Revisiting the Court's IP
jurisprudence in the post-2000 era in light of future cases would be a valuable
extension of our work.
Another valuable extension of our research would be to consider the effect
of ideology on IP cases heard at the federal courts of appeal and the federal
district courts. In particular, it would be interesting to see whether the
188. Responding to our study in this Article, Barton Beebe has subsequently tested the
effect of ideology in copyright cases dealing with the fair use doctrine. Beebe's preliminary results
produced a null result. See Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use
.Outcomes?: Evidence From the Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517 (2008).
189. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007);
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc.,
547 U.S. 28 (2006); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006); Merck
KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
190. The 2006-2007 term was the most significant term for patent law in the Supreme
Court since the 1965-1966 term.
191. Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L.
SCi. & TECH. 1 (2007).
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ideological effect we find in relation to the Supreme Court is also evident in the
Federal Circuit, given its narrow jurisdiction. There is no equivalent of the
Martin-Quinn scores for appellate and district court judges; however,
alternative techniques may prove amenable.
192
Although we can resoundingly reject the notion that IP is immune to the
effects of ideological division, there is evidence that IP differs from other areas
of the law. There is a significant difference between the extent to which
ideology shapes IP cases and the extent to which it affects other areas of the
law. This could be because IP is a commercial subject that less clearly evokes
the sometimes emotional division between liberals and conservatives that areas
such as civil rights and abortion raise. Or it could be for the diametrically
opposite reason: because, as we discussed in our theory section, IP raises
salient but somewhat contradictory core principles of liberty, property, free
speech, and the proper role of government.
Our research also highlights the complexity of the relationship between
ideology and IP. Critically, we found that the effect of ideology is not uniform
across the ideological spectrum: once we differentiated between liberal and
conservative justices, the effect of ideology on IP was significant only for
conservative justices. We know that liberal justices are equally ideological
generally, so this difference is unlikely to be because conservatives are acting
ideologically in IP but liberals are not. Since we have also rejected the notion
that IP cases are simply not salient enough to trigger an ideological response, it
is likely that the difference we see between liberals and conservatives in IP is
due to the two groups of justices being differently affected by the theoretical
tensions underlying IP: natural rights versus utilitarianism, respect for property
versus suspicion of government regulation, and the disputed impact of IP on
individual liberty and freedom of expression. These theoretical tensions appear
to create more ambiguity for liberals than for conservatives.
In particular, the stronger relationship between IP and ideology for
conservatives suggests that the status of IP rights as private property may well
be a trump against other competing values. This suggests a further extension of
our analysis in future work: a direct comparison of the voting behavior of the
justices in real property cases and IP cases.
In politics it is commonly observed that the conservative camp is split
between libertarians and conservatives.' 93 In IP, however, our research suggests
192. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-Making Under a Norm of Consensus: A
Structural Analysis of Three-Judge Panels (1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies
Paper, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=912299. The party of the
appointing president is unlikely to be a useful measure of ideology in Federal Circuit decisions
because Republican-appointed judges accounted for 92.3% of opinions in their sample. See
Allison & Lemley, supra note 7.
193. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, A Split Emerges As Conservatives Discuss Darwin, N.Y.
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that it is the conservative justices who are unified and the liberals who are split.
This implication has repercussions for litigation strategies in IP cases. Once
again, the Eldred decision brings this point into focus.
Lawrence Lessig, the architect of the constitutional challenge to the
CTEA, argues that the Eldred case could have been won if he had adopted a
different strategy. Lessig believed he could persuade the same conservative
justices who, after the Court's decision in Lopez, had increasingly voted to
restrict Congress's attempts to create legislation pursuant to its authority under
the Commerce Clause.' 94 Lessig therefore based his strategy in Eldred on an
appeal to the conservative members of the Court to limit the power of Congress
under the Copyright Clause.
Our empirical findings suggest that Lessig's attempt to persuade the
conservative justices that interpretive fidelity should trump their pro-property
inclinations was quixotic. The relationship between ideology and voting in IP
cases is clear for conservative justices but ambiguous for liberals. Lessig would
have been better off focusing on the issues that would persuade liberals and
moderate swing justices, highlighting the redistributive effects of the CTEA,
the dangers of corporate control over cultural resources, and the need to tailor
copyright monopolies more closely to incentives. The attitudinal model predicts
that ideology will trump interpretive fidelity. Unfortunately, Lessig finds the
idea that Supreme Court justices decide cases based on their political
preferences "extraordinarily boring." 195 Perhaps a greater appreciation for the
attitudinal model would have improved his chances before the Supreme Court.
This Article also makes a significant contribution to the study of judicial
decision-making more broadly. Although there is considerable evidence
supporting the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making in non-economic
areas, such as criminal procedure and administrative law, there is much less
evidence to support the attitudinal model in economic areas such as taxation,
securities, and antitrust.
The significance of our contribution showing the effect of ideology in IP
cases is best understood in relation to comparable studies in the tax field. The
most comprehensive study of the effect of ideology in tax cases found no
support for the role of ideology using the coding of the general database.
196
Staudt et al. argue that the conventional coding of all tax outcomes favoring the
government as pro-Underdog is overinclusive, given the heterogeneity of non-
government parties. For example, it seems unreasonable to classify a ruling
denying a poor taxpayer the right to the Earned Income Tax Credit as a pro-
TIMES, May 5, 2007, at A1.
194. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Lessig, supra note 103.
195. Lessig, supra note 103; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
196. See Staudt et al., supra note 24. Note that this study also uses Martin-Quinn scores as
a measure of ideology.
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Underdog outcome. Staudt et al. sought to overcome this limitation in the
conventional coding by focusing on a particular class of taxpayers for which
they believe the conventional coding is apposite: corporate taxpayers. With the
parameters thus refined, the authors found ideology is significant in corporate
tax cases.' 97 In contrast, our study found a significant effect for ideology in an
economic area of the law without the need for any such refinements.
Our central finding that ideology is a significant determinant of how
Supreme Court justices vote in relation to IP addresses a significant gap in the
attitudinal literature: the effect of ideology in economic cases. And our
additional finding that ideology has less of an effect on IP than other areas of
the law emphasizes the need for further inquiry into the differences between the
effect of ideology on economic and non-economic areas of the law in general.
Finally, locating judicial attitudes toward IP within the liberal-
conservative ideological continuum enables us to make some predictions about
the direction of the Court in relation to IP. The Supreme Court's most recent
appointments, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, have decided only a few
IP cases to date. Our study indicates that despite this sparse record, we can
deduce the likely predispositions of these justices in relation to IP by observing
their votes in cases that have nothing to do with IP. Based on their voting
record in the 2005-2006 term, Justices Roberts and Alito are conservative to
the same degree that Chief Justice Rehnquist was, and they are significantly
more conservative than Justice O'Connor was.' 98 All other things being equal,
this forecasts a Roberts Court that is more sympathetic to IP claims than the
Rehnquist Court. The model we have presented here can be utilized in future
work to assess these predictions and other theories about Supreme Court
judicial attitudes toward IP.
197. See id.
198. The 2005-2006 Martin-Quinn scores for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are
1.38 and 1.41 respectively. The 2004-2005 Martin-Quinn scores for former chief justice
Rehnquist and former justice O'Connor are 1.41 and 0.08, respectively.
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APPENDIX: CASES IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DATASET
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Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394
(2006)
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005)
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005)
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111 (2004)
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535
U.S. 826 (2002)
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722
(2002)
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S.
124 (2001)
New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001)
Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000)
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999)
Pfaffv. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998)
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998)
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research International, Inc.,
523 U.S. 135 (1998)
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17
(1997)
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
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Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 516 U.S. 233
(1996)199
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995)
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995)
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)
Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83
(1993)
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993)
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992)
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991)
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990)
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990)
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988)200
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987)
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)
Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986)
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568
(1985)
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985)
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985)
Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985)
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984)
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983)
199. Affirmed by an equally divided Court, not used in our statistical analysis.
200. Not classified as either for or against the IP Owner.
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Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844
(1982)
Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981)201
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)
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Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S.
394 (1974)
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)
United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973)
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)
Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S.
706 (1972)
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972)
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)
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tion, 402 U.S. 313 (1971)
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321 (1971)
Standard Industries, Inc. v. Tigrett Industries, Inc., 397 U.S. 586
(1970)
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57
(1969)
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969)
201. Affinmed by an equally divided Court, not used in our statistical analysis.
202. Affirmed by an equally divided Court, not used in our statistical analysis.
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Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
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